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Populations with disabilities are at higher risks of food insecurity and low employment 
than those without a disability which can lead to poor nutritional outcomes and 
decreased quality of life. The objective of this dissertation is to examine the effects of 
participation in assistance programs for households with disabled members and to 
analyze the effects of policy changes that designed to improve employment outcomes for 
people with disabilities. This dissertation consists of three essays and in the analyses, we 
consider three programs that include the Supplemental Security Income (SSI) and 
Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP) in the U.S. and the Employment 
Quota System (EQS) in South Korea.  
The objective of the first essay is to understand the underlying relationships 
between food insecurity and various disability characteristics of household members and 
look at how the relationship is affected by participation in assistance programs. Using 
data from the 2011–2016 National Health Interview Survey and by applying ordered 
probit and local polynomial regression models, we find that food insecurity is not only 
affected by type, severity, and multiplicity of disability of a household member but also 
affected by who in the household has a disability. Results suggest that participation in 
assistance programs may shield food security from a household member’s disability. 
The objective of the second essay is to examine the effects of SNAP participation 
and the 2013 SNAP benefit changes on food insecurity for households with disabled 




Survey (NHIS) 2011–2015, in which two different indicators of disability are used: the 
presence of member(s) with disabilities and who in the household has a disability. To 
obtain more efficient and consistent estimates, copula distribution functions are 
incorporated into in the maximum likelihood function of the switching regression model 
in which state-specific SNAP policy variables serve as instrumental variables to satisfy 
exclusion restrictions. Main results suggest that SNAP is more effective in reducing food 
insecurity for households with disabled members than for those without disabled 
members, and the effects of SNAP vary with a household head’s, spouse/partner’s and 
children’s disabilities. Additionally, we find that the decrease in SNAP benefits that 
occurred in 2013 weakens the program’s effectiveness. 
The objective of the third essay is to examine a set of changes in the employment 
quota system for people with disabilities that was implemented in 2010 in South Korea. 
Using data from the Panel Survey of Employment of the Disabled (PSED) from South 
Korea and ordered probit models with sample selection, we estimate the extent to which 
these exogenous policy changes have desired employment outcomes for people with 
disabilities. Results suggest that policy changes bring about improved employment for 
only men with disabilities; for women with disabilities, no improved employment 

















I would like to thank my committee chair, Dr. Ariun Ishdorj, for all of her guidance and 
support during my graduate studies and completing this dissertation. I have learned from 
her how to develop my career path as a researcher. I would like to thank my co-chair of 
committee, Dr. Frederick Boadu, for supporting me to complete my Ph.D. study and 
always greeting me with a big smile. I also would like to thank Dr. James Mjelde and 
Dr. Lisako McKyer for serving as my committee members and giving valuable 
comments to my research. I would like to thank Dr. David Bessler, Dr. David Leatham, 
and Dr. Yvette Zhang for their time and support.  
Very special thanks go to Dr. Christian Gregory for his tremendous support for 
my research and priceless advice on my dissertation. I would like to express my 
gratitude to Dr. Takuya Hasebe for his valuable advices on my model estimations and 
computational supports, though we have not met in person and I look forward to meeting 
him in near future. Thanks also goes to Dr. Bethany DeSalvo, Dr. Frances McCarty, and 
Dr. Rong Wei for their support for data-use and disclosure process. 
I would like to express appreciation to my family for their endless support and 
love, and most importantly, to my wife. Without her, this moment would not have been 





CONTRIBUTORS AND FUNDING SOURCES 
 
Contributors 
This dissertation was supported by a dissertation committee consisting of Dr. Ariun 
Ishdorj as advisor, Dr. Frederick Boadu as co-advisor, and Dr. James Mjelde of the 
Department of Agricultural Economics and Dr. Lisako McKyer of the School of Public 




The first essay in this dissertation was supported by funding from a Cooperative 
Agreement between Economic Research Service (ERS) of United States Department of 
Agriculture and Texas A&M University (#58-5000-5-099). The second essay was 
supported by the Cooperative Agreement and dissertation grant from Tufts 
University/University of Connecticut Research Innovation and Development Grants in 
Economics (RIDGE) Program by support from USDA’s Food and Nutrition Service 
(FNS) and ERS. 
The analyses and views expressed are the authors and do not represent the 
Economic Research Service of the United States Department of Agriculture, RIDGE, the 
Census Bureau, the National Center for Health Statistics, Federal Research Data Centers, 
the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, the South Korean government and its 




dissertation has been screened to ensure no confidential data are revealed and was 
conducted while the authors were Special Sworn Status researchers of the U.S. Bureau at 
the Center for Economic Studies. The second essay in this dissertation was approved by 
the Institution Review Board of Texas A&M University with regard to use of 









DEDICATION .................................................................................................................. iv 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ............................................................................................... v 
CONTRIBUTORS AND FUNDING SOURCES ............................................................. vi 
TABLE OF CONTENTS ............................................................................................... viii 
LIST OF TABLES ............................................................................................................. x 
LIST OF FIGURES ........................................................................................................ xiii 
1. INTRODUCTION .......................................................................................................... 1 
2. UNDERSTANDING THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN FOOD INSECURITY 
AND DISABILITY OF HOUSEHOLD MEMBERS ........................................................ 4 
2.1. Introduction ............................................................................................................. 4 
2.2. Related Literature .................................................................................................... 6 
2.3. Data and Measure .................................................................................................... 8 
2.3.1. Food Insecurity ................................................................................................. 8 
2.3.2. Disability ........................................................................................................ 10 
2.3.3. Participation in Assistance Program(s) .......................................................... 12 
2.4. Methodology ......................................................................................................... 12 
2.4.1. Parametric Framework ................................................................................... 13 
2.4.2. Nonparametric Framework ............................................................................. 14 
2.4.3. Analytical Sample .......................................................................................... 15 
2.5. Results ................................................................................................................... 16 
2.5.1. Descriptive Statistics ...................................................................................... 16 
2.5.2. Ordered Probit Models ................................................................................... 17 
2.5.3. Nonparametric Specifications. ....................................................................... 20 
2.6. Discussion and Conclusions .................................................................................. 21 
3. THE EFFECTS OF SNAP PARTICIPATION AND THE 2013 SNAP BENEFIT 
DECREASES ON FOOD INSECURITY FOR HOUSEHOLDS WITH DISABLED 




3.1. Introduction ........................................................................................................... 24 
3.2. Related Literature .................................................................................................. 26 
3.3. Data and Measures ................................................................................................ 28 
3.3.1. Food Security and SNAP Participation .......................................................... 29 
3.3.2. Disability ........................................................................................................ 29 
3.3.3. Control Variables and Analytical Sample ...................................................... 30 
3.4. Econometric Analysis ........................................................................................... 32 
3.4.1. Endogenous Switching Regression ................................................................ 32 
3.4.2. Identification .................................................................................................. 34 
3.4.3. Maximum Likelihood Estimation using Copulas ........................................... 36 
3.4.4. Measures for Dependence and Program Effects ............................................ 37 
3.5. Estimation Results ................................................................................................. 38 
3.5.1. Model Specification and Tests for Instruments .............................................. 38 
3.5.2. Parameter Estimates and Average Partial Effects .......................................... 40 
3.5.3. Program Effects .............................................................................................. 43 
3.6. Robustness ............................................................................................................. 45 
3.7. Discussion and Conclusions .................................................................................. 46 
4. THE EFFECTS OF CHANGES IN DISABILITY EMPLOYMENT POLICIES 
ON THE EMPLOYMENT OUTCOMES OF THE DISABLED –– EVIDENCE 
FROM SOUTH KOREA ................................................................................................. 49 
4.1. Introduction ........................................................................................................... 49 
4.2. The Employment Quota System for the Disabled in Korea .................................. 50 
4.3. Related Literature .................................................................................................. 53 
4.4. Data and Measure for Analyses ............................................................................ 54 
4.5. Methodology ......................................................................................................... 57 
4.6. Results ................................................................................................................... 60 
4.6.1. Results from the Full-Sample Model ............................................................. 60 
4.6.2. Results from the Sub-Sample Analyses by Gender ........................................ 61 
4.7. Robustness ............................................................................................................. 64 
4.8. Discussion and Conclusions .................................................................................. 66 
5. CONCLUSIONS .......................................................................................................... 68 
REFERENCES ................................................................................................................. 71 
APPENDIX A TABLES FOR SECTION 2 .................................................................... 82 
APPENDIX B TABLES FOR SECTION 3 ..................................................................... 93 
APPENDIX C TABLES FOR SECTION 4 ................................................................... 104 




LIST OF TABLES 
 
 Page 
Table A-1. 30-Day Scale 10-Item (Adult) Food Security Questions in the NHIS ........... 82 
Table A-2. Descriptive Statistics by Ordered Food Security Status ................................ 83 
Table A-3. Descriptive Statistics for Sub-Samples .......................................................... 85 
Table A-4. Parameter Estimates for Model 1: Type and Severity of Disability .............. 86 
Table A-5. Parameter Estimates for Model 2: Household Member’s Disabilities ........... 87 
Table A-6. Parameter Estimates for Model 3: Multiple Disabilities ................................ 88 
Table A-7. Average Partial Effects for Model 1: Adults’ Type and Severity of 
Disability on Food Insecurity ........................................................................... 89 
Table A-8. Wald Test Results for the Differences in the Effects of Disabilities by 
Severity of Disability (Model 1) ....................................................................... 90 
Table A-9. Wald Test Results for the Differences in the Effects of Disabilities 
between Severe Physical Disability and the Other Severe Disabilities 
(Model 1) .......................................................................................................... 90 
Table A-10. Wald Test Results for the Differences in the Effects of Disabilities 
between Non-Severe Physical Disability and the Other Non-Severe 
Disabilities (Model 1) ....................................................................................... 90 
Table A-11. Average Partial Effects for Model 2: Household Members’ Disabilities 
on Food Insecurity ............................................................................................ 91 
Table A-12. Wald Test Results for the Comparison between the Effects of 
Spouse/Partner with and without Disabilities and Children with and without 
Disabilities on Food Insecurity (Model 2) ........................................................ 91 
Table A-13. Average Partial Effects for Model 3: Multiple Disabilities of Adults on 
Food Insecurity ................................................................................................. 91 
Table A-14. Wald Test Results for the Effects of Multiple Disabilities of Adults on 





Table B-1. Summary Statistics by SNAP Participation and Food Insecurity .................. 93 
Table B-2. Summary Statistics for Instruments by State, Averaged over 60 Months ..... 95 
Table B-3. Summary Statistics for Instruments by Year, Averaged over States ............. 96 
Table B-4. Parameter Estimates for Model 1 with AMH–Plackett Copula ..................... 97 
Table B-5. Parameter Estimates for Model 2 with AMH–Plackett Copula ..................... 98 
Table B-6. Parameter Estimates for Model 3 with AMH–Plackett Copula ..................... 99 
Table B-7. Average Partial Effects for Model 1 with AMH–Plackett Copula............... 100 
Table B-8. Average Partial Effects for Model 2 with AMH–Plackett Copula............... 101 
Table B-9. Average Partial Effects for Model 3 with AMH–Plackett Copula............... 102 
Table B-10. Estimates for the Average Treatment Effects on the Treated .................... 103 
Table B-11. Robustness check ....................................................................................... 103 
Table C-1. Monthly-Grant per Excess by Severity of Disability, Gender, and the 
Employment Rate of Disabled Employees until March 2010 ........................ 104 
Table C-2. Monthly-Grant per Excess by Severity of Disability, Gender, and 
Employment Period since April 2010............................................................. 104 
Table C-3. Monthly-Levy per Shortfall by Disability Employment Rate to Quota in 
2017 ................................................................................................................ 104 
Table C-4. Summery Statistics ....................................................................................... 105 
Table C-5. Parameter Estimates for a Full Sample Model ............................................. 106 
Table C-6. Average Partial Effects for a Full Sample Model ........................................ 107 
Table C-7. Parameter Estimates for a Male Sample Model ........................................... 108 
Table C-8. Average Partial Effects for a Male Sample Model ...................................... 109 
Table C-9. Parameter Estimates for a Female Sample Model ....................................... 110 
Table C-10. Average Partial Effects for a Female Sample Model ................................. 111 




Table C-12. Robustness: Average Partial Effects for a Full-Sample Model.................. 113 
Table C-13. Robustness: Parameter Estimates for a Male Sample Model ..................... 114 
Table C-14. Robustness: Average Partial Effects for a Male Sample Model ................ 115 
Table C-15. Robustness Check: Parameter Estimates for a Female Sample Model ...... 116 









LIST OF FIGURES 
 
 Page 





1. INTRODUCTION  
 
Disability can lead to food insecurity and preclude employment, and result in decreased 
quality of life (Huang, Guo, and Kim 2010; Coleman-Jensen and Nord 2013; Hotchkiss 
2013; Baker et al. 2018). Efforts have been made to reduce economic vulnerability for 
populations with disabilities by providing various types of social services and supports 
and implementing employment policies. In the U.S. the Supplemental Nutrition 
Assistance Program (SNAP) and Supplemental Security Income (SSI) play important 
roles in helping people with disabilities to be more food and economically secure. In 
South Korea, the Employment Quota System (EQS), which is a widely used 
employment policy among non-U.S. countries, has been implemented that requires 
private firms and/or public firms to integrate a certain number or portion of people with 
disabilities into the workplace. Thus, looking at the roles of the programs and policies 
and evaluating whether the implemented changes resulted in the desired outcomes for 
the intended target populations is important in improving the understandings of 
policy/program’s effectiveness. The objective of this dissertation is to examine the 
effects of participation in assistance programs for households with disabled members 
and to analyze the effects of policy changes that designed to improve employment 
outcomes for people with disabilities by focusing on SNAP and SSI in the U.S. and the 
EQS in South Korea. 
Although there is no universal definition of disability (Palmer and Harley 2012), 




multiplicity of disability. In a household, who has a disability among household 
members can also be implicative. Using these various indicators of disability, the 
objective of the first essay is to investigate how the various disability characteristics are 
related to food insecurity, by doing so, how the relationships between food insecurity 
and a household member’s disability vary with participation in SSI and/or SNAP is 
examined.  
Households with disabled members are more likely to participate in SNAP and at 
the same time, these households are less likely to be food secure than those without 
disabled members (Coleman-Jensen and Nord 2013). Thus, to what extent SNAP 
participation reduces food insecurity for these households may be different from that for 
households without disabled members, which also may vary by household members’ 
disability status. The objective of the second essay in this dissertation is to examine the 
effects of SNAP participation on reducing food insecurity for households with disabled 
members using different indicators of disability: (1) the presence of member(s) with 
disabilities and (2) who has a disability among household members, i.e. a household 
head, spouse/partner, and/or children. Additionally, we estimate the change in the 
program’s effectiveness due to the 2013 SNAP benefit decreases, caused by the 
expiration of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA) of 2009, for 
households with and without disabled members. 
A variety policies and programs have been implemented and enacted in an effort 
to close the employment gaps between individuals with disability and without disability. 




effect in 1992 which prohibits discrimination on the basis of disability in hiring. 
However, it is understood that the ADA has brought unintended consequences by 
leading to negative effects on the employment outcomes for the disabled (DeLeire 2000; 
Acemoglu and Angrist 2001), or no effect (Hotchkiss, 2003). Unlike the US, more than 
third of OECD countries implement the Employment Quota System (EQS) that requires 
private and/or public firms to integrate a certain number or proportion of people with 
disabilities into a workplace. On the other hand, EQS instruments a monetary 
penalty/compensation scheme that imposes a levy if firms do not meet the quota but are 
subsidized if they employ disabled workers beyond the quota. In this context, looking at 
how other countries implement employment policies to provide better and secure 
employment for people with disabilities may be of particular interest. South Korea is one 
of the countries have the EQS, and recently there have been a set of policy changes in 
the EQS: (1) the quota increases for both public and private firms, (2) the 
implementation of the double count system for people with severe disabilities that 
regards the employment of an employee with severe disabilities as the employment of 
two employees with disabilities, and (3) the change in the grant policy for firms attained 
the quota. The objective of the third essay in this dissertation is to investigate whether 
these policy changes bring about enhanced employment outcomes for people with 
disabilities, with specific attentions paid to severity of disability and gender of 






2. UNDERSTANDING THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN FOOD INSECURITY 
AND DISABILITY OF HOUSEHOLD MEMBERS 
 
2.1. Introduction 
Food insecurity is one of the major public health concerns in the United States 
(Gundersen and Ziliak 2018). While most U.S. households have consistent access to 
enough food to maintain healthy and active lives, the prevalence of food insecurity in the 
U.S. is not negligible. In 2017, 11.8 percent of U.S. households (15.0 million 
households) were food insecure, including 5.8 million very low food secure households 
(Food Security Statistics, USDA 2018), which refers to the absence of adequate food 
access because of financial resource constraints.  
Previous studies on food insecurity have been devoted to finding its 
determinants, which encompass households’ socio-demographic characteristics, 
household income or income-related attributes. Not surprisingly, the likelihood of food 
insecurity declines as a household’s income rises (Gundersen, Kreider, and Pepper 
2011). Huang, Guo, and Kim (2010) further found that households’ economic or 
financial resources such as net worth, liquid assets, and home-ownership are related to 
food insecurity. In contrast, Coleman-Jensen et al. (2016) argued that in 2015 about 6 
percent of households with annual income at or above 185 percent of the Federal 
Poverty Level (FPL) were food insecure, and about 38 percent of households with 
income below 100 percent of the FPL were food insecure. They also found that the 




household members’ race and gender and household composition. While the 
demographic factors and household resources found in the current literature are 
significantly associated with food insecurity, disability can be one of the important 
factors that can also affect food insecurity of households. 
It is generally agreed that households with disabled members are more likely to 
be food insecure than those without disabled members (Coleman-Jensen and Nord 2013; 
Huang, Guo, and Kim 2010). This may be because of decreased disposable income 
(Mitra and Sambamoorthi 2006; Nord 2008; Huang, Guo, and Kim 2010; Ghosh and 
Parish 2013) and household members’ physical or mental limitations on food-related 
issues: meal planning, grocery shopping, and cooking (She and Livermore 2007; Webber 
and Dollahite 2007; Huang et al. 2012). They are more likely to participate in assistance 
programs, by which food insecurity status of their households may be alleviated to some 
extent. For example, it is well-documented that participation in Supplemental Security 
Income (SSI) and Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP) is more common 
among households with disabled members than those without disabled members 
(Coleman-Jensen and Nord 2013; SSI Annual Statistical Report 2017). Taken together, it 
could be suggested that household member(s)’ disabilities and program participation can 
be good predictors of food insecurity of households. 
The objectives of this essay are to examine how various disability characteristics 
of household members are related to food insecurity. First, little is known about whose 
disability among household members impinges more on food insecurity than other 




food insecurity, in this context, other household members’ disabilities may have 
different effects on food insecurity. We take into account household heads’, 
spouse/partners’ and children’s disabilities and examine their effects on food insecurity. 
Second, we examine how specific types of disabilities and severity and 
multiplicity of these disabilities are related to food insecurity as comprehensive 
empirical evidence on this issue is lacking. We expect that households with a member 
with a severe disability are more likely to be food insecure than those with the non-
severe disability because of over-extraction of household resources, and the relationship 
may differ by which type of disability he/she has. Multiple impairments of a household 
member may be positively associated with the higher likelihood of food insecurity.  
Third, given the positive relationship between food insecurity and severity of 
disability, for a certain disability type, the degree of limitation of a household member 
may have a nonlinear rather than additive effect on the level of food insecurity, and this 
non-linearity may vary with household resources: income or participation in assistance 
programs. We take into account SSI and SNAP and examine how the non-linear 
relationships between food insecurity and a specific type of disability of a household 
member varies by participation in the assistance programs.  
2.2. Related Literature 
Research on the relationships between food insecurity and disability characteristics of 
household members has focused on household members’ specific types of disabilities. 
Coleman-Jensen and Nord (2013) looked at a household member’s hearing, vision, 




households with a working-age adult with vision, mental, and physical disabilities are 
more likely to be food insecure than those without a disability. More recently, Brucker 
(2016) has looked at young adults’ (age 18–25) mental disabilities, which are measured 
using the Kessler index of psychological distress, and six different types of disabilities: 
ambulatory, cognitive, hearing, vision, independent living, and self-care. She found that 
adults with mental disabilities or with one of the six limitations are more likely to be 
living in a food insecure household than their respective counterparts. Further, Brucker 
and Nord (2016) found that individuals with intellectual or developmental disabilities are 
more likely to be food insecure than those without a disability. Different household 
members’ disabilities may have different effects on food insecurity, and among them 
household heads’ disabilities may have the greatest negative effects on food security as 
they are usually a primary income earner. In this context, other household member’s 
disabilities may have different effects on food insecurity. However, in the current 
literature, little attention has been paid to this issue except for Huang, Guo, and Kim’s 
(2010) study. They found that household head’s disabilities are related to increased food 
insecurity, but the variable for household heads’ disabilities turned out to be insignificant 
when a spouse/partner’s disability status is controlled for in the model. 
Much of the research on food insecurity and participation in safety-net 
programs, such as SNAP, the National School Lunch Program (NSLP), Temporary 
Assistance for Needy Families (TANF), and SSI, has estimated the programs’ 
effectiveness in reducing food insecurity with controlling for individuals’ or households’ 




reduces food insecurity to some extent (Borjas 2004; Bartfeld and Dunifon 2006; Yen et 
al. 2008; Depolt, Moffitt, and Ribar 2009; Mykerezi and Mills 2010; Ratcliffe, 
McKernan, and Zhang 2011; Gundersen, Kreider, and Pepper 2017; Zhang and Yen 
2017; Gundersen, Kreider, and Pepper 2018). Schmidt, Shore-Sheppard, and Watson 
(2016) found that the receipts of SSI and TANF reduces food insecurity. Gundersen, 
Kreider, and Pepper (2017), Artega and Heflin (2014), and Miller (2016) found that the 
NSLP decreased food insecurity of NSLP participating children. 
2.3. Data and Measure 
The data used come from 2011 through 2016 National Health Interview Survey (NHIS). 
The NHIS provides a rich set of information about household members’ demographic 
characteristics, disability, and household characteristics such as food insecurity and 
participation in assistance programs. We use the “Person,” “Family,” “Sample Adult,” 
and “Adult Functioning and Disability” cores of the NHIS in the analysis. 
2.3.1. Food Insecurity 
The United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) utilizes the 18-item Food Security 
Survey Module (FSSM) to assort a household’s food security status in the last 12 months 
into one of these four categories: high food secure, marginal food secure, low food 
secure, and very low food secure, of which the items 1 through 10 refer to adult1 food 
security. The “Family” core of the NHIS contains 30-day-based2 adult food security 
questions, which are analogous to the questions in the USDA-FSSM. In table A-1, the 
                                                 
1 The last 8 items refer to child-referenced food insecurity 




10-item food security questions are listed (10-item food security questions, “Family” 
core of the NHIS 2011–2016). The first three questions are answered by the ordinal scale 
that responses of “often true” and “sometimes true” are coded as affirmative; the 
following five questions are answered by the yes/no format; and the answers to two 
occurrence frequency questions are considered as affirmative if numerical answers3 are 
greater than or equal to three days. Based on the sum of affirmative responses scaled 
from 0 to 10, an ordered food security status of adults in a household is classified into 0 
for “high food secure”, 1-2 for “marginal food secure”, 3-5 for “low food secure”, and 6-
10 for “very low food secure”. A binary food security is defined by classifying “high 
food secure” and “marginal food secure” into “food secure” and “low food secure” and 
“very low food secure” into “food insecure”. We use these ordered and binary food 
security measures for analyses. Additionally, we index a continuous food insecurity 
scale score to use more information from the variously scaled responses to the food 
security questions. To this end, we deal with three variables: (1) aggregate score from 
the first three questions (out of 6), (2) aggregate score from the five binary format 
questions (out of 5), and (3) aggregate score from the two frequency occurrence 
questions (out of 60). We apply the Principal Component Analysis (PCA) to these three 
variables in order to extract a major component with the largest eigen-value and 
standardize the major component with zero mean and unit variance. 
                                                 
3 In the first stage, households with affirmative responses to “often true” or “sometimes true” to one or more items of 
the first three questions are asked to answer four yes/no questions and a frequency question in the second stage. 
Households with non-affirmative answer to the first three questions are regarded as non-affirmative to remaining all the 
seven questions. If households affirmatively answer to the one or more four yes/no questions, they are asked a binary 
question and a frequency question in the last stage. Similarly, non-affirmative households to the four binary questions 





Although there is no universal measure of type and severity of disability, commonly 
used indicators are six questions included in the federal household surveys. For example, 
the American Community Survey (ACS) and Current Population Survey (CPS) utilize 
survey respondents’ self-reported answers to the 6 Question Sequence (6QS): limitations 
on ambulatory, cognitive, hearing, vision, independent living, and self-care. Another 
disability measure often used is the Kessler index for assessing an individual’s 
psychological wellness using standardized and validated six (K6) or ten (K10) items.  
Each core and supplement of the NHIS asks survey respondents’ health 
conditions and information about disability differently. In this essay, household 
members’ disabilities are measured in two different ways. First, using “Adult 
Functioning and Disability (AFD)4” supplement, six disability types of a randomly 
selected adult (hereafter, adult) in each household are taken into account: vision, hearing, 
physical, cognitive, communicative, and self-care disability. As degree of these 
disabilities are assessed as “no difficulty,” “some difficulty,” “a lot of difficulty,” and 
“cannot do at all”, we classify “no difficulty” into “no limitation”, “some difficulty” and 
“a lot of difficulty” into “non-severe disability”, and “cannot do at all” into “severe 
disability”. Additionally, to capture an adult’s multiple disabilities, we count number of 
their disabilities regardless of severity: 0–6. Using a household identifier, a family 
relationship variable, and a question in the “Person” core asking whether an individual 
                                                 
4 The AFD is a sub-file of the “Sample Adult” core. About a half (2011, 2013–2016) and a quarter (2012) of all the 




has “any limitation-for all condition”, household heads5’ disability status are measured 
dichotomously, and if a spouse/partner or children are present, their disability status are 
measured by sets of dummy variables. 
Second, an adult’s psychological distress is measured by using the six-item 
Kessler index (K6) from the “Sample Adult” Core. The Kessler psychological distress 
scale is well-known in that it utilizes a short screening device to evaluate the level of 
distress associated with non-specific psychological symptoms in the general population 
(Kessler et al. 2002; Anderson et al. 2011). It is comprised of six questions asking 
adults’ degree of psychological distress; how often they have felt in past 30 days: (1) so 
sad nothing to cheer up, (2) felt nervous, (3) felt restless or fidgety, (4) felt hopeless, (5) 
felt everything was an effort, and (6) how often felt worthless. Severity of each domain 
is scored by the five-pointwise scale: 4-all of the time, 3-most of the time, 2-some of the 
time, 1-a little of the time, and 0-none of the time, which makes the sum of scores 0–24. 
Based on this raw score with specific cut-off points, previous studies specified an 
ordered or a binary status with respect to severity of psychological distress (Furukawa et 
al. 2003; Brucker 2016). To elicit a non-linear relationship between food insecurity and 
the degree of psychological distress of an adult, we index a standardized continuous 
psychological distress scale score using the PCA. Additionally, we use a binary index for 
severe psychological distress of an adult which is coded as 1 if the sum of raw score is 
greater than or equal to 13 as Brucker (2016) and Furukawa et al. (2003) used. 
                                                 
5 The NHIS does not provide information about who is a household head among household members but define a 
household reference person as the person who owns or rents the housing unit, we regard the household reference person 




2.3.3. Participation in Assistance Program(s) 
As noted, we focus on SSI and SNAP as they are major public assistance programs for 
low-income households with disabled members. Information about households’ 
participation in these programs come from the “Family” core in which participation is 
coded affirmatively if a household received benefits from each of the programs in the 
last 12 months prior to the survey. For program eligibility, a gross-income threshold of 
SNAP receipt is 130 percent of the FPL. However, in some states, the Broad-based 
Categorical Eligibility6 (BBCE) increases the income threshold to 200 percent of the 
FPL. Although there is no specific cut-off in the gross-income eligibility for SSI, the 
monthly basis income limit for SSI for an adult is nearly 110 percent of the FPL, and 
that for children due to a disability is nearly 200 percent of the FPL. Accordingly, we 
focus on households with annual income below 200 percent of the FPL for our analyses 
on the basis of programs eligibility.  
To examine variations in the relationship between food insecurity and an adult’s 
psychological distress by participation in assistance programs, we assign the number of 
assistance programs that households participated: 0 for non-participation, 1 for 
participation in any of the programs, and 2 for participation in both programs. 
2.4. Methodology 
Because we have multiple interests on the relationship between food insecurity and 
differently measured household members’ disabilities and need to sidestep overfitting 
                                                 





problems that arises from multicollinearity between the different disability measures, 
three respective parametric models are estimated based on: an adult’s type and severity 
of disability (Model 1), disability status of a household head, spouse/partner, and 
children (Model 2) if the spouse/partner and children are present, and multiplicity of 
disability of an adult (Model 3). To examine a non-linear relationship between an adult’s 
psychological distress and food insecurity, we employ a nonparametric estimation model 
(Model 4).  
2.4.1. Parametric Framework 
We apply an ordered Probit model to Models 1 through 3; 
(1)   𝐹𝑆𝑖
∗ = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑋𝑖 + 𝛽2𝐷𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖 ,    𝑖 = 1,… ,𝑁                                     
where 𝐹𝑆𝑖 is the observed ordered food security status of a household 𝑖 in the last 30 
days from the survey which is governed by a latent variable 𝐹𝑆𝑖
∗, where 




   0   𝑖𝑓   𝐹𝑆𝑖
∗ ≤ (−∞, 𝜇1]
  1   𝑖𝑓   𝐹𝑆𝑖
∗ ∈ (𝜇1, 𝜇2]    
 2   𝑖𝑓   𝐹𝑆𝑖
∗ ∈ (𝜇2, 𝜇3]   
3   𝑖𝑓   𝐹𝑆𝑖
∗ > (𝜇3, ∞]
                                              
Values of 𝐹𝑆𝑖, 0 to 3, correspond to the status of high food secure, marginal food 
secure, low food secure, and very low food secure. 𝜇1, 𝜇2, and 𝜇3 are estimable cutoff 
points. 𝑋𝑖 controls for a household head’s socio-demographic characteristics: age, 
gender, race, marital status, educational background, and employment status, as well as 
household characteristics such as home-ownership, number of kids, gross-income, and 




disability of an adult, as well as, a household head’s, spouse/partner’s, and children’s 
disabilities. 𝜀𝑖 is an error term with zero mean and constant variance 𝜎𝜀
2.  
2.4.2. Nonparametric Framework 
We employ Fan and Gijbels (1996)’s kernel-weighted local polynomial regression 
model with a smooth, continuous, and unknown function 𝑚(∙) as specifies; 
(3)         𝑌𝑖 = 𝑚(𝑋𝑖) + 𝜖𝑖 
where 𝑋𝑖 is the level of psychological distress of an adult in a household 𝑖: 
standardized psychological distress scale score, and 𝑌𝑖 is the standardized food 
insecurity scale score. 𝜖𝑖 is a symmetric disturbance. Without imposing any 
assumptions, we aim to estimate 𝑚(𝑥0) = 𝐸(𝑌|𝑋 = 𝑥0). Using a Taylor expansion for 
some 𝑥 in the neighborhood of 𝑥0, 𝑚(𝑥0) can be estimated as the constant of a 
regression of 𝑌𝑖 on the 𝑝-th order polynomial terms. By incorporating a kernel function 
𝐾(∙) that is a density function symmetric at zero and a bandwidth ℎ and defining 𝛽𝑗 =
𝑚(𝑗)(𝑥0)/𝑗! for 𝑗 = 0,… , 𝑝, ?̂?0 = ?̂?(𝑥0) is obtained by minimizing in 𝛽0 such that  







where 𝐾ℎ(𝑎) = ℎ
−1𝐾(𝑎/ℎ). The bandwidth is obtained by using Fan and Gijbels 
(1996)’s Rule of Thumb (ROT) method which minimizes the conditional weighted mean 
integrated squared error. The resultant ROT bandwidth is computed as follows: 








where 𝐶0,𝑝(𝐾) is a constant depends on the kernel function 𝐾(∙) and the degree of 




[𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑋 + 0.05 × 𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒𝑋 ,𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑋 − 0.05 × 𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒𝑋] where 𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑋, 𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑋, and 𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒𝑋 
is minimum, maximum, and the range of 𝑥. ?̂?2 is estimated as a standardized residual 
sum of squares from fitting a polynomial in 𝑥 of order (𝑝 + 3) to 𝑌𝑖. In this 
specification, the 3rd degree polynomial smoothing function with the Epanechnikov 
kernel is used.  
2.4.3. Analytical Sample 
A full sample for ordered Probit models includes 78,214 households in all income levels. 
For nonparametric analyses, we use subsamples by income and number of program 
participation because of a lack of variables controlling for endogeneity issues that arise 
from self-selected program entries into SSI and SNAP. By doing so, we examine how 
non-linear relationships between food insecurity and an adult’s psychological distress 
vary with income and program participation, rather than estimating causal effects of 
program participation.  
First, the full sample is divided into three subsamples: low-income households 
below 200 percent of the FPL (N=28,561), middle-income between 200 and 400 percent 
of the FPL (N=22,526), and high-income above 400 percent of the FPL (N=27,127). 
Second, low-income households eligible for program participation are further divided 
into three subsamples: low-income households participating in any one of the programs 
(N=9,478), in both programs (N=2,519), and non-participants (N=16,564), respectively. 







2.5.1. Descriptive Statistics 
Descriptive statistics of our full sample by ordered food security status are presented in 
table A-2. Households are predominantly comprised of as high food secure (82 percent). 
Overall, household heads of low and very low food secure households are more likely to 
be non-Hispanic Black, less educated, unmarried/widowed/divorced/separated, and 
unemployed. Additionally, low and very low food secure households are more likely to 
be in low-income and rented.   
As expected, food insecurity and household heads’ disabilities are positively 
related. That is, about a half (52 percent) of very low food secure households are headed 
by a person with disabilities. On the contrary, 9 percent of low food secure and 11 
percent of very low food secure households are populated by spouses/partners with 
disabilities. It appears that children’s disabilities are least relevant with the prevalence of 
food insecurity; 9 percent of low and very low food secure households have children 
with disabilities. We can see that household resources are strongly related to food 
insecurity. Low-income households are more likely to be food insecure, and as more 
food insecure, the households tend to participate in SSI, SNAP, or both programs. 
Descriptive statistics for the nonparametric specifications are presented in table A-3. We 
find that low-income households are more likely to have an adult with severe 
psychological distress, and households with an adult with severe psychological distress 





2.5.2. Ordered Probit Models  
Given parameter estimates of the three ordered Probit models reported in tables A-4 
through A-6, we estimate the average partial effects (APEs) of covariates on the ordered 
food security status. The APEs of Model 1 are presented in table A-7. We find that 
adults’ specific types and severity of disabilities are closely related to food insecurity. 
Households with an adult with severe vision, hearing, physical, or cognitive disability 
are more likely to be low and very low food secure than those with the adult without a 
disability. Households with an adult with all the types of non-severe disabilities are more 
likely to be low and very low food secure than those with the adult without a disability. 
For each of six disability types, we test whether severe disability has different effects on 
low and very low food security compared to non-severe disability using Wald tests. 
These test results are presented in table A-8 and suggest that severe hearing, cognitive, 
and self-care disabilities do not have significantly different effects on low food security 
compared to each respective non-severe disability. Similarly, severe hearing and self-
care disabilities do not have significantly different effects on very low food security 
compared to each respective non-severe disability. 
For the six disability types, in terms of magnitude, severe physical disability has 
the greatest effects on increased low food security (2.9 percent points) and very low food 
security (3.3 percent points) compared to the other types of severe disabilities. However, 
Wald test results in table A-9 suggest that the effects of severe physical disability of an 




severe vision and cognitive disabilities but greater than those of hearing, communicative, 
and self-care disabilities. 
The presence of an adult with all the types of non-severe disabilities are related 
to increased low and very low food security. Compared to households with an adult 
without a disability, households with the adult with non-severe physical disability are 
more likely to be low and very low food secure by 2.0 and 2.2 percent points, 
respectively. Similarly, households with an adult with non-severe cognitive and vision 
disabilities are more likely to be low food secure by 2.0 and 1.8 percent points and very 
low food secure by 2.1 and 1.9 percent points than those with the adult without a 
disability, respectively. We test whether non-severe physical disability has significantly 
different effect on low and very low food security compared to other types of non-severe 
disabilities. According to the Wald test results in table A-10, the effects of non-severe 
physical disability of an adult on low and very low food security are not significantly 
different from those of non-severe vision and cognitive disabilities but greater than those 
of non-severe hearing, communicative, and self-care disabilities. 
Turning to the APEs from Model 2 in table A-11, the results are consistent with 
the findings from the descriptive statistics in that food security is most affected by a 
household head’s disabilities than the other members’ disabilities. We suppress the 
APEs of the other covariates for brevity and due to similarity of those of Model 1. 
Households headed by a person with disabilities are more likely to be low and very food 
secure by 4.4 and 4.9 percent points than those headed by a person without a disability, 




are less likely to be low and very low food secure by 1.4 percent points than those 
without a spouse/partner. On the contrary, households headed by a person with a 
spouse/partner with disabilities are more likely to be low and very low food secure by 
1.4 and 1.5 percent points than those without a spouse/partner, respectively. We test 
these different effects of the presence of a spouse/partner and children with and without 
disabilities on food insecurity, the results from which are reported in table A-11. We find 
that the presence of a spouse/partner and children with disabilities have significantly 
greater effects on decreased low and very food security than the presence of a 
spouse/partner and children without a disability. 
Children’s disabilities are significant predictors of low and very low food 
security as well. Households with children without a disability are less likely to be low 
and very low food secure by 0.5 and 0.6 percentage points than those without children, 
respectively. On the contrary, households with children with disabilities are more likely 
to be low and very low food secure by 0.9 and 1.0 percent points than those without 
children, respectively. Wald test results reported in table A-12 are supportive of the 
different effects of the presence of children with and without disabilities on low and very 
low food security. 
Lastly, we find that multiple disabilities are related to food insecurity. It can be 
inferred from the results from Model 3 in table A-13 that as adults have multiple 
impairments, households are more likely to be low and very low food secure. Wald test 
results in table A-14 reject the hypotheses of equal effects of different numbers of 




2.5.3. Nonparametric Specifications. 
The first principal component with the largest eigenvalue, 2.34, generates the 
standardized food insecurity scale score ranging from –0.33 to 9.88 with zero mean and 
unit variance. Similarly, the standardized psychological distress scale score ranges from 
–0.63 to 5.51 with zero mean and unit variance that is generated by the first principal 
component with the largest eigenvalue, 3.63. Note that the horizontal and vertical axes in 
figure D-1 describe the standardized food insecurity and psychological distress scale 
scores, respectively.  
First, for the low-income households below 200 percent of the FPL, we find a 
positive relationship between food insecurity and adults’ psychological distress. Food 
insecurity linearly increases as the psychological distress scale score reaches 4.0, and 
then a drastic curve is seen. For the high-income households above 400 percent of the 
FPL, we obtain a markedly different result from that of the low-income households; the 
food insecurity scale score moderately rises with a lower slope over the domain of the 
psychological distress scale score. For the middle-income households between 200 and 
400 percent of the FPL, food insecurity gradually increases with the psychological 
distress scale score up to near 3.8, and then an inverse U-curve appears.  
Second, we find that the relationships between food insecurity and adults’ 
psychological distress vary with households’ participation in assistance programs. The 
low-income non-participating households experience gradually increasing food 
insecurity with adults’ aggravated psychological distress. In contrast, for households 




levels of psychological distress, which is similar with that of the low-income 
households. Food insecurity of households participating in both programs turned out to 
have a moderate pattern of increase with the adults’ psychological distress, which is 
analogous to that of the low-income non-participants. 
2.6. Discussion and Conclusions 
Although we used data from the NHIS with slightly different measures of disability from 
the 6QS categorization, the findings from the parametric specifications are consistent 
with Coleman-Jensen and Nord’s results (2013) that the presence of a working-age adult 
with vision, physical, or mental disability is positively related to increased food 
insecurity. In addition, our results suggest that hearing disability is related to increased 
food insecurity as well.  
We find that the disability status of household members is a significant predictor 
of food insecurity. Whereas the presence of a spouse/partner and children with 
disabilities are positively associated with food insecurity, the presence of those without a 
disability are negatively associated with food insecurity. These results mainly differ 
from Huang, Guo, and Kim (2010)’s findings that the indicator of the household head’s 
disability loses its statistical significance when spouse’s disability is controlled for in the 
analysis.  
The results from the nonparametric specifications confirm that the relationships 
between adults’ psychological distress and food insecurity differ by household income 
level and participation in assistance programs. At any level of adults’ psychological 




low-income households. In contrast, for middle-income households, we observe an 
inverse U-relationship between food insecurity and high levels of psychological distress, 
which might be due to uncontrolled household attributes which are associated with both 
food insecurity and psychological distress. For low-income households, food insecurity 
almost uniformly grows over low to mid-level of psychological distress and then 
drastically increases at the very high level of psychological distress. Taken altogether, it 
can be concluded that households’ high-income may shield food security from adults’ 
aggravated psychological distress. The results from the restricted samples are supportive 
of these findings; compared to households participating in both SSI and SNAP, food 
insecurity of households participating in only one program is more sensitive to adults’ 
aggravated psychological distress. Additionally, we can see that the regression curve for 
households participating in both programs are somewhat similar with that for the low-
income non-participating households. This implies that resources from the benefit 
programs may help the low-income households to be more food secure, similar with the 
low-income non-participants who are not eligible for program entry due to moderate 
amounts of assets or are not necessary to participate. 
It should be noted that there are limitations in the nonparametric specifications. 
We could not adequately control for potential endogeneity but bypass the issue by 
utilizing restricted samples. Thus, non-parametric regression results on the effect of 
participation in assistance programs on reducing food insecurity should be interpreted 
with caution. Future studies would need to revisit and test the results by using other 




Our overall results suggest that household members’ various disability characteristics are 
strongly linked to food insecurity. To protect those who are suffering from food-related 
hardships among population with disabilities, by means of meeting the intensity of their 
needs through a channel of public assistance, figuring how disability and food insecurity 
is related and understanding the role of program participation would be matters of 
importance. Using data from the NHIS, we add empirical evidence to existing literature 




3. THE EFFECTS OF SNAP PARTICIPATION AND THE 2013 SNAP BENEFIT 




Although most households in the United States have stable access to adequate food for a 
healthy lifestyle, food insecurity is still a major health concern. In 2017, 11.8 percent 
(15.0 million) of U.S. households were food insecure at times, including 4.5 percent (5.8 
million) of households with very low food security (USDA-ERS Food Security Statistics 
2018), which means that their access to adequate food was limited by a lack of money 
and other resources (Coleman-Jensen et al. 2016).  
Individuals with disabilities and households with disabled members are more 
likely to be food insecure or living in food insecure households than those without a 
disability or those without disabled members (Coleman-Jensen and Nord 2013; Huang, 
Guo, and Kim 2010; Brucker 2016; Brucker and Nord 2016; Burke et al. 2016; Sonik et 
al. 2016). This gap in food security might be because of limited economic resources, 
high disability-related expenses, and limited work opportunities, as well as, limitations 
on food preparation such as meal planning, grocery shopping, and cooking (Kemmer 
1999; Mitra and Sambamoorthi 2006; Webber, Sobal, and Dollahite 2007; She and 
Livermore 2007; Parish, Rose, and Andrews 2009; Huang, Guo, and Kim 2010; Huang 




The United States has implemented a variety of food assistance programs7 that provide 
benefits for food-at-home spending or in-kind support for eligible low-income 
households or individuals. The Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP) is 
one of such programs designed to mitigate food insecurity and improve nutritional well-
being of participants. SNAP is the largest food assistance program in the United States; 
program costs of SNAP in 2017 amounted to $68 billion, with an average monthly 
SNAP benefit of about $127 per person (USDA-FNS SNAP Data and Statistics 2018).  
Vulnerable segments of the populations comprise a large portion of SNAP 
participants. In 2016, about 20 percent of SNAP participating households had no cash 
income and nearly two-thirds of those households had children, elderly, or at least one 
member with disabilities (Lauffer 2017). Coleman-Jensen and Nord (2013) found that in 
2009–2010 47 percent of households with income below 185 percent of the Federal 
Poverty Level (FPL) that also had a member who is unable to work due to a disability 
participated in SNAP, compared to 27 percent of similar households with no working-
age adults with a disability. Thus, households with disabled members may be distinct in 
terms of SNAP participation and food insecurity compared to those without disabled 
members, accordingly SNAP may have different effects on food insecurity for 
households with disabled members compared to those without disabled members. 
Beginning in April 2009, the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 
(ARRA) raised SNAP benefits by 13.6 percent at a maximum, and as a result food 
                                                 
7 Well-known food assistance programs operated by USDA are the Emergency Food Assistance Program (TEFAP), 
National School Lunch Program (NSLP), Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Programs (SNAP), the Special 




insecurity of households below with income 130 percent of the FPL decreased by 2.2 
percentage points from 2008 to 2009 (Nord and Prell 2011). Additionally, Nord (2013) 
found that the SNAP benefit increases reduced the number of SNAP participating 
households with very low food security by about 34 percent. In November 2013, on the 
other hand, the temporary SNAP benefit boost expired and the average monthly benefits 
decreased8 by about 5 percent on average. 
The objective of this essay is to examine how the effects of SNAP participation 
on food insecurity differ by: (1) the presence of disabled individuals and (2) who among 
household members, a household head, spouse/partner and/or children, have disability, 
which are less understood in the current literature on food insecurity and SNAP. 
Additionally, we estimate the changes in the effectiveness of SNAP due to the 2013 
SNAP benefit decreases for households with and without disabled members, thereby 
compare the changes in the effectiveness between these two cohorts.  
3.2. Related Literature 
Previous studies on SNAP and food insecurity found either positive associations of 
SNAP with food insecurity (Jensen 2002; Ribar and Hamrick 2003; Wilde and Nord 
2005; Huang, Guo, and Kim 2010) or no significant relationships (Gundersen and 
Oliveira 2001; Huffman and Jensen 2008).  
More recent studies have found that SNAP participation reduces food insecurity 
with specific attentions paid on controlling for self-selection; food insecure households 
are more likely to enroll in SNAP due to various observed and unobserved household 
                                                 




characteristics compared to food secure households. Borjas (2004) instruments the 1996 
welfare reform legislation as an exogenous SNAP benefit change to control for 
endogenous SNAP participation and found that SNAP participation reduces the 
probability of food insecurity among SNAP participating non-immigrant households by 
2 percent points. Bartfeld and Dunifon (2006) utilized hierarchical modeling to control 
for unobserved household characteristics related to SNAP participation and found that 
households in the states with higher SNAP participation rates are less likely to be food 
insecure.  
A series of studies utilized instrumental variables (IVs) approach to identify a 
food insecurity equation that include an endogenous variable for SNAP participation. 
Yen et al. (2008), Mykerezi and Mills (2010), Ratcliffe, McKernan, and Zhang (2011), 
and Zhang and Yen (2017) made use of IVs for state-specific SNAP policy or other 
SNAP-related individuals’ characteristics such as stigma, which are highly correlated 
with SNAP participation but not correlated with food insecurity. Using different 
estimation techniques, based on the framework of a treatment effect model, with the IVs, 
they found that SNAP participation reduces food insecurity to some extent.  
Very recently, there have been efforts to estimate the treatment effects of SNAP 
participation on food insecurity without imposing exclusion restrictions controlling for 
the endogeneity issue. Gundersen, Kreider, and Pepper (2017) used partial identification 
methods to estimate lower and upper bounds on the average treatment effects of SNAP 
on food insecurity, rather than obtaining the point estimates. They found that SNAP 




points. Gundersen, Kreider, and Pepper (2018) utilized a survey question from the 
Current Population Survey (CPS) that asks how much money the respondents would 
need to be food secure. They defined these amounts of money as the resource gap and 
found that a $42 increase in weekly SNAP benefits for SNAP participating households 
brings about a 62 percent reduction in food insecurity. 
Little is known about the relationship between food insecurity and the 2013 
SNAP benefit decreases. One study in the literature, Katare and Kim (2017) used 
difference in differences approach with an assumption that only food insecurity of SNAP 
participating households was affected by the SNAP benefit decreases. They found that 
the 2013 SNAP benefit decreases resulted in 3.7 percentage point increase in the 
prevalence of food insecurity among SNAP participating households compared to non-
SNAP households.  
3.3. Data and Measures 
Individual and household-level data come from the National Health Interview Survey 
(NHIS) 2011–2015, a cross-sectional annual survey of households that collects 
information on the health status and various socio-economic and demographic 
characteristics of the non-institutionalized population of the U.S. We use both public- 
and restricted-access NHIS data. The former is comprised of information about 
household members’ socio-economic and demographic characteristics, disability, 
households’ participation in assistance programs, and 30-day-based9 adult food security. 
The restricted-access data includes a state-level identifier, by which state-specific SNAP 
                                                 




policy variables are merged into the public-access NHIS data set. The SNAP policy 
variables come from the policy database available from the Economic Research Service 
(ERS), USDA (USDA-ERS SNAP Policy Data Sets 2018). We obtained geographic data 
on household location through a data sharing agreement with the National Center for 
Health Statistics (NCHS) and gained access to confidential NCHS data under Special 
Sworn Status. As these data are made accessible through the Texas Research Data 
Center (TXRDC) at Texas A&M University, all the analyses were conducted at the 
TXRDC.  
3.3.1. Food Security and SNAP Participation 
In this essay, we use the binary food security measure which is based on the sum of 
affirmative responses to the 10-item adult food security questions: food secure for 0–2 
affirmatives and food insecure for 3 or more affirmatives. Information about households’ 
participation in SNAP are taken from two questions about households’ enrollment in 
SNAP that ask whether any family member has received SNAP benefits and number of 
months received in the last year. To link current food security to current SNAP 
participation, households participated in SNAP during the previous 12 months are 
assumed to be participating in SNAP in the 30 days prior to the survey. 
3.3.2. Disability 
The NHIS not only provides detailed information about household members’ self-
reported physical and mental conditions but also includes comprehensive assessments of 
household members’ disability status. First, we utilize a binary question: “Is any family 




Second, to capture disability status of a household head10, spouse/partner, and children11 
in a household, we identify each person in the household according to their relation to 
the household reference person and use indicators of “any limitation, for all conditions” 
to identify disability. Although these measures on disability status may have limitations 
on capturing diverse dimensions of disabilities e.g. type or severity, they cover all the 
gradients of disabilities comprehensively without omission, and similar ones were 
utilized in other studies on disability (Burkhauser, Haveman, and Wolf 1993; DeLeire 
2000; Acemoglu and Angrist 2001; Hotchkiss 2003; Nazarov, Kang, and Schrader 
2015). 
3.3.3. Control Variables and Analytical Sample 
Control variables consisting of socio-economic and demographic characteristics of 
households include household head’s age, gender, race, education attainment, marital 
status, employment status, U.S. citizenship status, and home-ownership. Household 
characteristics such as household size and participation in the Supplemental Security 
Income (SSI), Medicaid, and Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) are 
included as well. Given that food security is based on households’ experience in the last 
30-day from the survey, to fully detect the effects of SNAP benefit decreases on food 
                                                 
10 The NHIS does not contain information about who is a household head in the household but describes a household 
reference person as the person age 18 or older who owns or rents the household. We identify the household head with 
the household reference person. 
11  Based on this information, we set a set of binary variables for a spouse/partner’s and children’s disabilities. 
Households headed by a person with a spouse/partner without a disability and households headed by a person without a 





insecurity, the dummy variable for the post-SNAP benefit decrease period is coded as 1 
if a household was interviewed in December 201312 or thereafter. 
Although a gross monthly income limit for SNAP eligibility is 130 percent of the 
FPL, the Broad-Based Categorical Eligibility (BBCE) rule can raise the threshold in 
some states, and no state has the gross income limit above 200 percent of the FPL 
(USDA-FNS Broad-Based Categorial Eligibility Chart 2018). Accordingly, the primary 
analytical sample includes households below 200 percent of the FPL. Since multifamily 
households may share SNAP benefits within the household that may produce imprecise 
program effects, these households are excluded from the sample (1,939 households). 
Summary statistics of our analytical sample (N = 64,209), classified by 
households’ SNAP participation and binary food security status, are reported in table B-
1; eligible non-SNAP participant households represent 71 percent of our sample. A 
higher rate of food insecurity (36 percent) is observed among SNAP participating 
households compared to non-SNAP households (22 percent), implying that there may 
exist adverse self-selection into SNAP.  
As for the presence of disabled members, food insecure SNAP participating 
households are more likely to have disabled members (68 percent) than food secure 
SNAP households (48 percent). As for household members’ disabilities, food insecure 
SNAP participating households are more likely to have a household head (54 percent), 
spouse/partner (10 percent), or children (14 percent) with disabilities than food secure 
SNAP households (35, 6, and 11 percent, respectively).  
                                                 




Food insecure non-SNAP households are more likely to have member(s) with 
disabilities (49 percent) than food secure non-SNAP households (32 percent). As for 
household members’ disabilities, food insecure non-SNAP households are more likely to 
have a household head (38 percent), spouse/partner (8 percent), or children (8 percent) 
with disabilities than food secure non-SNAP households (23, 6, and 5 percent, 
respectively). Overall, our analytical sample shows that households with disabled 
members are more likely to be food insecure and more likely to participate in SNAP. 
3.4. Econometric Analysis 
3.4.1. Endogenous Switching Regression 
SNAP-eligible households can choose to participate in SNAP, and this decision can be 
driven by observed and unobserved household characteristics. As Gregory and Coleman-
Jensen (2013) pointed out, some previous research using a framework of a treatment 
effect model (Yen et al. 2008; Ratcliffe, Mckernan, and Zhang 2011) assumed that the 
effects of the observables on food insecurity are the same for SNAP and non-SNAP 
households. In this essay, we relax this strong assumption and posit that the effects of 
the presence of disabled members or household members’ disabilities on food insecurity 
would differ for SNAP and non-SNAP participating households. Accordingly, we use a 
framework of an endogenous switching regression model (ESR, hereafter) (Maddala 
1983) and a system of equations are defined as follows: 
 (6)    𝑆𝑁𝐴𝑃𝑖
∗ = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝑋𝑖 + 𝛼2𝑍𝑖 + 𝛼3𝜇𝑖 + 𝛼4𝜆𝑖 + 𝜀𝑠𝑖  
(7)    𝐹𝐼1𝑖
∗ = 𝛽1 + 𝛽11𝑋𝑖 + 𝛽21𝜇𝑖 + 𝛽31𝜆𝑖 + 𝜀1𝑖  
(8)     𝐹𝐼0𝑖




where i indexes a household. 𝑆𝑁𝐴𝑃𝑖
∗ is a latent SNAP participation dummy and 𝑆𝑁𝐴𝑃𝑖 
is a binary variable indicating households SNAP participation with 𝑆𝑁𝐴𝑃𝑖 =
1 if 𝑆𝑁𝐴𝑃𝑖
∗ > 0, 𝑆𝑁𝐴𝑃𝑖 = 0 otherwise. Similarly, 𝐹𝐼1𝑖
∗  and 𝐹𝐼0𝑖
∗  are latent variables 
of food insecurity status of SNAP and non-SNAP participating households, with 𝐹𝐼𝑠𝑖 =
1 if 𝐹𝐼𝑠𝑖
∗ > 0, 𝐹𝐼𝑠𝑖 = 0 otherwise, for s = 0,1. 𝑋𝑖 includes households’ socio-
economic/demographic characteristics and information about household members’ 
disabilities. 𝑍𝑖 denotes a set of instruments. 𝜇𝑖 and 𝜆𝑖 are year and state dummy 
variables, respectively.  
We have two research questions about the effects of SNAP participation on 
reducing food insecurity by (a) the presence of member(s) disabilities and (b) the 
distribution or composition of household members’ disabilities in a household, and an 
additional question about (c) the change in the program effectiveness of SNAP due to 
the 2013 SNAP benefit decreases for households with and without disabled members. 
Because an inclusion of the disability indicators of both (a) and (b) in the covariates may 
lead to overfitting problems due to multicollinearity, two respective models are 
estimated centering on each of the disability indicators. Model 1 estimates a system of 
equations with a binary variable indicative of the presence of any household member 
with disabilities. The structure of Model 2 is equivalent to Model 1 except replacing the 
binary disability variable with a set of dummy variables for a household head’s and 
spouse/partner’s, and children’s disability status. The structure of Model 3 is equivalent 




pre- and post-SNAP benefit decreases. Household sampling weights are applied to all 
the analyses to provide results nationally-representative.  
3.4.2. Identification 
We apply a Full Information Maximum Likelihood (FIML) procedure to the ESR model, 
in which dependence structures of the error terms are incorporated into the maximum 
likelihood function. To help model identification that stems from the non-linearity of the 
jointly distributed error terms, we utilize exclusion restrictions, which requires at least 
one variable which is highly correlated with SNAP participation but uncorrelated with 
food security enters into the SNAP equation. To this end, as in equation (6), we use a set 
of instrumental variables (IVs), 𝑍𝑖, which refers to state-specific SNAP rules; since 
households interviewed are randomly drawn from primary sampling units in each state, 
arguably specific policies for SNAP eligibility rules are not correlated with food 
insecurity but highly correlated with households’ SNAP participation which variates 
geographically. The set of the IVs is comprised of the variables for the BBCE, vehicle 
exemptions for SNAP asset test, and the use of combined application process for SNAP 
and SSI (USDA SNAP policy data sets 2018). Detailed variable explanations are as 
follows;    
(a) The BBCE rule confers categorical eligibility for SNAP if households are eligible 
for the non-cash TANF or State Maintenance of Effort (MOE) funded benefit.  
(b) Some states may exclude the value of all vehicles, at least one vehicle, or only the 




differs by state and year. Among three policies on the vehicle restrictions, we make 
use of the exclusion of all vehicles for SNAP asset test. 
(c) The combined application process for SNAP enables SSI recipients to be 
automatically eligible for SNAP by simplifying a SNAP application paper-work 
without visiting a SNAP office.  
Each of these variables is coded as 1 if the state implements the policy and 0 otherwise 
and may vary from state to state and by month and year. For brevity, summary statistics 
of the variables by state, averaged over 60 months (January 2011 to December 2015) are 
provided in table B-2 and summary statistics of the variables for each year averaged over 
the states are shown in table B-3. 
Second, as is apparent from the arguments of existing literature, obtaining 
consistent estimates of the standard ESR model rests on the joint normality of the error 
terms (𝜀𝑠𝑖, 𝜀1𝑖) and (𝜀𝑠𝑖, 𝜀0𝑖) (Smith 2003; Luechinger, Stutzer, and Winkelmann 2010; 
Yen, Bruce, and Jahns 2012; Hasebe 2013). However, when the true distribution is not 
normal, estimating a system via the FIML yields inconsistent estimates, even worse an 
iteration process may fail to find an optimum that satisfies the convergence criteria of 
the maximizing function. Thus, the accommodation of a flexible distribution structure in 
lieu of the joint normal distribution could be an alternative, and a copula distribution 
function can be a good candidate to do that.  
 Copula approach provides a way to generate non-normal dependence structures 
of random variables by specifying margins and a copula function that links the margins 




distribution of random variables as a priori, the copula approach could put more choices 
on model specifications as Luechinger, Stutzer, and Winkelmann’s (2010) and Yen, 
Bruce, and Jahns (2012)’s studies. We incorporate the copula joint distribution function 
into the maximum likelihood function of the ESR model, and then estimate the system 
of equations.  
3.4.3. Maximum Likelihood Estimation using Copulas 
Consider two random variables 𝑥1 and 𝑥2 are given. Let 𝑢𝑖 = 𝐹𝑖(𝑥𝑖) be a marginal 
distribution function for 𝑖 = 1, 2 and let 𝐹(𝑥1, 𝑥2) denotes a bivariate joint distribution 
function. By Sklar’s theorem (Sklar 1959), there exist a copula, 𝐶 ∶ [0,1]2 → [0,1], 
function such that                      
(9)   𝐹(𝑥1, 𝑥2) = 𝐶{𝐹1(𝑥1), 𝐹2(𝑥2); 𝜃} = 𝐶(𝑢1, 𝑢2; 𝜃)                                          
where 𝜃 is an estimable dependence parameter. Using the copula joint distribution 
function in lieu of 𝐹(𝑥1, 𝑥2), we can write the maximum likelihood function as  
(10)  𝐿 = ∏ {[𝐶(𝐹𝑠𝑖, 𝐹𝜀𝑖; 𝜃)]
𝑦𝑖=0 × [𝐹𝑠𝑖 − 𝐶(𝐹𝑠𝑖, 𝐹𝜀𝑖; 𝜃)]
𝑦𝑖=1}𝑠𝑖=0𝑁𝑖=1   
× {[𝐹𝜀𝑖 − 𝐶(𝐹𝑠𝑖 , 𝐹𝜀𝑖; 𝜃)]
𝑦𝑖=0 × [1 − 𝐹𝜀𝑖 − 𝐹𝑠𝑖 + 𝐶(𝐹𝑠𝑖 , 𝐹𝜀𝑖; 𝜃)]
𝑦𝑖=1}𝑠𝑖=1  
where 𝐹𝜀𝑖 = 𝐹𝜀𝑖(−𝑥𝑖𝛽) and 𝐹𝑠 = 𝐹𝑠𝑖(−𝑧𝑖𝛾). 𝑥𝑖 refers to all the covariates in the food 
security equations, and 𝑧𝑖 refers to the covariates and instruments in the SNAP 
participation equation. 𝑠𝑖 and 𝑦𝑖 denote SNAP participation and binary food insecurity 
status, which equals 1 for participation in SNAP and food insecurity and 0 vice versa, 
respectively. We apply a Probit marginal distribution to 𝐹𝑠𝑖, 𝐹𝜀0𝑖, and 𝐹𝜀1𝑖 but a 
selection of the copulas is important since each copula portrays a different dependence 




Gaussian, Ali-Mikhail-Haq (AMH), Farlie-Gumbel-Morgenstern (FGM), Frank, and 
Plackett copulas. See Nelson (2010) and Hasebe (2013) for functional forms of these 
copulas.  
To determine the best-fitting copula for the underlying distribution of the error 
terms, in general, the Akaike or Bayesian Information Criterion (AIC/BIC) is used. 
Alternatively, under a given specification on the margins and parameters, a selection of 
copulas with the largest log-likelihood value is equivalent to those with the smallest 
information criteria (Hasebe 2013; Winkelmann 2012).  
3.4.4. Measures for Dependence and Program Effects 
A copula function includes a dependence parameter, 𝜃, which measures the degree of 
dependence between random variables. The dependence parameter of a copula, however, 
cannot be compared to the one of the other copulas (Hasebe 2013) since each 𝜃 is 
distributed on a different range. Instead of 𝜃, Kendall’s 𝜏 allows universal comparisons 
to the degrees of dependence of random variables. It is defined as; 
(11)        𝜏 = 4∫∫𝐶(𝑢1, 𝑢2; 𝜃)𝑑𝐶(𝑢1, 𝑢2; 𝜃) − 1  
The Kendall’s 𝜏 provides an overall measure of dependence not only for elliptically13 
but also non-elliptically distributed random variables (Embrechts, Lindskog, and Mcneil 
2003), which is preferred to a standard linear correlation coefficient that only provides a 
partial measure of dependence if the dependence structure is non-elliptical (Carmona 
2004). 
                                                 




The Average Treatment Effect (ATE) and the Average Treatment Effect on the Treated 
(ATET) are frequently used terms measuring program effects. Whereas the ATE 
measures the program effect on randomly drawn households from the entire sample, the 
ATET evaluates that on the program participants, and thus could be more policy-
relevant. We estimate the ATET for SNAP participating households. It is written as 
(12)     𝐸{𝑃(𝑦1 = 1|𝑥, 𝑆 = 1) − 𝑃(𝑦0 = 1|𝑥, 𝑆 = 1)}  
The first expression in the square bracket is the predicted probability of food insecurity 
of SNAP participating households. The second term is the predicted probability of food 
insecurity of SNAP households if they had not been participated, which is an estimable 
counterfactual in the ESR model. The terms in the square bracket are averaged over 
SNAP participating households. Additionally, we estimate the conditional ATETs 
(CATETs) for SNAP participating households, which are conditioned on the indicators 
of disabilities. These CATETs refer to the ATETs in various subpopulations (Abrevaya, 
Hsu, and P.Leili 2015) and are defined as; 
(13)         𝐸{𝑃(𝑦1 = 1|𝑋 = 𝑥1, 𝑆 = 1) − 𝑃(𝑦0 = 1|𝑋 = 𝑥1, 𝑆 = 1)}   
3.5. Estimation Results 
3.5.1. Model Specification and Tests for Instruments  
For each of the three models, we conduct 25 estimations14 using each pair of copulas 
among Gaussian, AMH, FGM, Frank, and Plackett, and then compare the log-likelihood 
values. We obtain marginally more efficient results with the AMH–Plackett copula, 
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which have the largest log-likelihood value for all of the Model 1(–59,670.02), Model 
2(–59,559.36), and Model 3(–59,720.86). What follows is the Wald test15 for testing 
joint dependence of the error terms: (𝜀𝑠𝑖, 𝜀1𝑖) and (𝜀𝑠𝑖, 𝜀0𝑖). The test results reject the 
hypothesis of independence of the error terms for all the models (test statistics=35.50, 
35.98, and 38.15 with p<0.01 for Models 1 through 3, respectively), meaning that the 
error terms are jointly dependent. Further, the test results imply that SNAP and non-
SNAP households are distinct with regard to food insecurity, and the ESR model would 
be preferred to a standard treatment effect model that assumes observed household 
characteristics of SNAP and non-SNAP households are the same with regard to food 
insecurity (Gregory and Coleman-Jensen 2013). 
Two types of tests for the validity of our instruments are conducted for all the 
models. First, we test the instrument relevance using Staiger and Stock (1997)’s weak 
instrument test. This involves estimating a Probit model for SNAP participation on 
covariates and instruments to verify whether coefficients of the instruments are close to 
zero and test joint significance of the instruments. For all the models, each of the 
instruments has a positive sign as expected and only the combined application process is 
statistically significant (p<0.01), though the Wald test results indicate that the set of the 
instruments is jointly statistically significant (p<0.01) with test statistics above the rule 
of thumb level (𝜒2(3)=26.10, 25.68, and 26.35 for Models 1 through 3, respectively). 
Second, to test overidentification, we estimate Probit models for the food insecurity 
                                                 
15 We applied sampling weights (probability weights) to estimations, so pseudo-likelihoods were computed. In this 




equation on the covariates, instruments, and SNAP participation variable, and then 
conduct joint tests for the instruments. This test procedure is analogous to Rashad and 
Kaestner’s (2004), Kan’s (2006), and Yen, Bruce, and Jahns’s (2012). The Wald test 
results indicate that the instruments are not jointly significant for all of the models 
(p=0.15 with 𝜒2(3)=5.35 for Model 1, p=0.15 with 𝜒2(3)=5.34 for Model 2, and 
p=0.11 with 𝜒2(3)=6.06 for Model 3). Taken together, exclusion restrictions are 
satisfied for all the models. 
3.5.2. Parameter Estimates and Average Partial Effects  
Using the best preferred combinations of the copulas for each model and the IVs, we 
estimate three ERS models, Models 1 through 3, and their results are presented in tables 
B-4 through B-6, respectively. For all the models, we can see a positive and statistically 
significant 𝜏0, implying that for non-SNAP participating households, unobservables that 
increase the probability of food insecurity are likely to occur with unobservables in the 
SNAP participation. For all the models, the ancillary 𝜃16 has a negative sign and 
significant only for Model 2. This implies that for SNAP households, unobservables that 
decrease the probability of food insecurity are likely to occur with unobservables that 
increase SNAP participation 
Based on the parameter estimates of Model 1, the average partial effects (APEs) 
of the covariates on the probabilities of SNAP participation and food insecurity by 
                                                 
16 The ancillary dependence parameter of a copula, generated by the maximum likelihood routine, spreads 𝜃 on a 
different range, and its distribution is independent of 𝜃. Since τ for the Plackett copula cannot be calculated via a 





SNAP participation are calculated and presented in table B-7. For the equation for SNAP 
participation, we can see that households headed by a person who is female, 
widowed/divorced/separated, U.S. citizen, unemployed, renter, less-educated, and Non-
Hispanic Black are more likely to participate in SNAP than their respective counterparts. 
Household size and the receipts of SSI, Medicaid, and TANF are positively associated 
with SNAP participation. 
Turning to the APEs in the food insecurity equation for the non-SNAP 
households, the presence of household member(s) with disabilities leads to the 
probability increase in food insecurity by 15.8 percent points. We find that households 
with a household head who is female, renter, U.S. citizen, non-Hispanic Black, 
widowed/divorced/separated, and unemployed are more likely to be food insecure than 
their respective counterparts. The participation in other assistance programs is positively 
associated with the probability of food insecurity and household size is inversely 
associated with food insecurity.  
For the SNAP participating households, the presence of household member(s) 
with disabilities leads to the probability increase in food insecurity by 14.8 percentage 
points. Households with a household head who is female, non-U.S. citizen, unemployed 
are more likely to be food insecure than their respective reference groups. Household 
size is inversely related to the probability of food insecurity as those of non-SNAP 
households, but Medicaid enrollment is inversely related to food insecurity, which is 
contrary to those of non-SNAP households. The rest of the covariates are not statistically 




The APEs in Model 2 are presented in table B-8. We mainly focus on the APEs of the 
variables for household members’ disabilities since all the other APEs are analogous to 
those in Model 1. For non-SNAP participating households, household with a household 
head with disabilities are more likely to be food insecure by 17.1 percent points than 
those without a disability. Households with a household head with a spouse/partner with 
disabilities are more likely to be food insecure by 9.9 percent points than households 
with a household head with a spouse/partner without a disability or households with a 
household head without a spouse/partner. Households with children with disabilities are 
more likely to be food insecure by 5.8 percent points than households with children 
without a disability or households without children. 
For SNAP participating households, household with a household head with 
disabilities are more likely to be food insecure by 14.1 percent points than those without 
a disability. Households with a household head with a spouse/partner with disabilities 
are more likely to be food insecure by 13.2 percent points than households with a 
household head with a spouse/partner without a disability or households with a 
household head without a spouse/partner. Households with children with disabilities are 
more likely to be food insecure by 6.1 percent points than households with children 
without a disability or households without children. 
The APEs of Model 3 are presented in table B-9. As our main interests lie in the 
magnitude and statistical significance of the indicator of the 2013 SNAP benefit 
decreases, we focus on these estimates for both food insecurity equations by SNAP 




insecurity equation for non-SNAP households can be interpreted as non-SNAP 
households are less likely to have been food insecure by 3.7 percentage points since 
November 2013 due to unobserved secular trends. On the contrary, the secular trends 
have no significant effect on food insecurity of SNAP households; the negative 0.014 
coefficient is not statistically significant. 
3.5.3. Program Effects 
In this essay, the unconditional ATETs measure the program effect of SNAP for all 
SNAP households. The CATETs measure the program effects of SNAP households for 
various subpopulations of interests in terms of disability: (a) SNAP households with and 
without disabled members, (b) SNAP households with a household head with and 
without disabilities, SNAP households with a household head with a spouse/partner with 
disabilities and those without disabilities or without a spouse/partner, and SNAP 
households with children with disabilities and those without disabilities or without 
children, and (c) SNAP households before and after the 2013 SNAP benefit decreases 
and SNAP households with and without disabled members before and after the benefit 
decreases. All these results are provided in table B-10, in which standard errors of the 
ATETs are obtained via the bootstrap method with 50 replications17 in order to account 
for both the sampling variability of parameter estimates and the variability of stochastic 
covariates.  
                                                 
17 Normal-approximation confidence intervals and standard errors of the ATETs are obtained using a nonparametric 
bootstrap method as Terza (2016) proposed. In this case, 50–200 replications are adequate to use (Stata manual for 




For all the models, we find that all the ATETs have negative signs and statistically 
significant at the 1 percent level of statistical significance, of which the unconditional 
ATET in Model 1 suggests that SNAP participation reduces the probability of food 
insecurity by 13.2 percent points for all SNAP participating households. More 
importantly, SNAP reduces the probability of food insecurity by 15.3 and 11.4 percent 
points for SNAP households with and without disabled members, respectively. 
For Model 2, there seem to be little difference in the magnitudes of the program 
effects for all SNAP participating households compared to those in Model 1. To what 
extent SNAP reduces food insecurity varies according to who in the household has 
disabilities. While SNAP reduces the probability of food insecurity by 11.9 percentage 
points for SNAP participating households with a household head without a disability, for 
SNAP households with a household head with disabilities, the program’s effect amounts 
to 17 percent points. The ATETs also differ by spouse/partners’ disabilities. SNAP 
reduces the probability of food insecurity for SNAP households with a spouse/partner 
with disabilities by 11.5 percent points, whereas it reduces the probability of food 
insecurity for SNAP households headed by a person without a spouse/partner or those 
with a spouse/partner without a disability by 13.9 percent points. Lastly, it seems to be 
little difference in the magnitudes of the effects of SNAP on food insecurity by 
children’s disability status. SNAP reduces the probability of food insecurity for SNAP 
participating households with children with disabilities by 14.3 percent points, while it 
reduces the probability of food insecurity by 13.6 percent points for SNAP households 




Turning to the ATETs in Model 3, whereas the unconditional ATET has still the same 
magnitude as in Model 2, a notable difference is found in the magnitudes of the 
effectiveness of SNAP between two different cohorts with respect to the SNAP benefit 
decreases. That is, whereas SNAP reduces the probability of food insecurity by 15.3 
percent points for all SNAP participating households before the benefit decreases, its 
effectiveness decreases to 11.6 percent points for SNAP households after the benefit 
decreases, which results in the reduced program’s effect by 3.7 percentage points for all 
SNAP households. Very little difference in the magnitudes of the decreased program 
effects is found between households with and without disabled members. For households 
with disabled members, the change in the program effects due to the SNAP benefit 
decreases amounts to 3.7 percent points. For SNAP households without disabled 
members, the reduced program effects run to 3.9 percent points.  
3.6. Robustness 
To check the robustness of the results, we primarily estimate all the three models with 
different sets of the copulas, and then calculate the unconditional ATETs, by which to a 
certain extent the results are sensitive to the selection of copulas is investigated. In these 
specifications, no convergence problem occurred, and iteration procedures find an 
optimum in less than 50 iterations.  
First, we estimate all the models with AMH–Frank copula that is the second best-
preferred set of copulas with the second largest18 log-likelihood values. Additionally, 
                                                 




we estimate all the models with Gaussian–Gaussian copula19 that is the most commonly 
used for postulating underlying distribution between random variables as a priori. All 
these estimates are presented in table B-11. We can see that there are no differences in 
the magnitudes of unconditional ATETs between the specifications with AMH–Plackett 
and AMH–Frank copula for all the models. On the contrary, Gaussian-Gaussian copula 
models yield the slightly decreased program effects compared to AMH–Plackett copula 
models.  
Second, one may have an interest in whether the models fit well without the 
instruments and how much the results vary accordingly. To check this, we estimate 
Model 1 without the instruments and with each of 25 combinations of the copulas, which 
result in AMH–Plackett and AMH–Frank copulas as the first and second best-fitting 
combinations of copulas, respectively. We calculate the unconditional ATETs for these 
models and a Gaussian–Gaussian copula model. The results show that there seem to be 
little differences in the magnitudes of the unconditional ATETs compared to each of the 
ATETs in Model 1 with instruments. Put together, we find out that the program effects 
depend more on the distributional assumption rather than the validity of exclusion 
restrictions. 
3.7. Discussion and Conclusions 
SNAP played an important role in increasing food security in SNAP participating 
households with disabled members compared to those without disabled members and all 
                                                 




households. SNAP reduces the probability of food insecurity for SNAP participating 
households headed by disabled––most likely to be at higher risk of food-related 
hardships partly due to a substantial loss in earnings––by 17.0 percent points, which is 
relatively greater than those of spouse/partner’s (11.5 percent points) and children’s 
disabilities (14.3 percent points). One noteworthy finding is that SNAP is more effective 
in reducing the probability of food insecurity for SNAP households headed by a person 
with a spouse/partner without a disability than those with disabilities or households 
headed by a person without a spouse/partner, that is 2.4 percent points difference. The 
policy implication of these findings is that who has a disability among different 
household members and the presence of disabled members can be good predictors to 
look at the program’s potential effectiveness; to what extent specific groups of 
populations with disabilities are expected to reduce the odds of food insecurity when 
SNAP benefits are given. 
We find that due to the decrease in SNAP benefit, the effectiveness of SNAP 
decreased by 3.7 percentage points for SNAP participating households, which is 
supportive of Katare and Kim (2017)’s findings that the SNAP benefit reductions led to 
an increase in the prevalence of food insecurity among SNAP participant households. 
Further, the reductions in the program effects are largely the same among all SNAP 
participating households and SNAP households with and without disabled members, 
implying that a 5 percent reduction on average in SNAP benefits was somewhat small to 




To better understand the program effects of SNAP participation, specifically for 
disadvantaged populations with disabilities, this essay provides quantifiable evidence 
about the impacts of SNAP participation in reducing food insecurity for these cohorts. 
Further research is needed in developing and extending the empirical models of this 
essay using other data and accounting for diverse measures of household members’ 





4. THE EFFECTS OF CHANGES IN DISABILITY EMPLOYMENT POLICIES ON 




It is generally recognized that people with disabilities are economically disadvantaged 
and prone to achieve poor employment outcomes compared to those without a disability. 
Moreover, people with disabilities are more likely to be employed in a part-time position 
and at a higher risk of dismissal than non-disabled counterparts (Choe and Baldwin 
2016; Erickson, Lee, and Schrader 2008; Bjelland et al. 2008; Schur 2003; Yelin and 
Trupin 2003; Baldwin and Schumacher 2002).  
A variety of policies and programs have been implemented and enacted in an 
effort to close the employment gaps between individuals with and without disabilities. 
For example, the U.S. passed the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA)20 in July 
1990, which ensures equal opportunity and non-discrimination in employment for people 
with disabilities. The ADA requires employers to offer accommodation of workers with 
disabilities in the workplaces without discrimination in wage, hiring, and firing 
(Acemoglu and Angrist 2001) and enables employees with disabilities to take legal 
actions if unreasonably discriminated. However, previous research found that the ADA 
has brought about unintended negative effects on the employment for the disabled that 
can be attributable to accommodation costs and the potential burdens of legal actions 
                                                 




against labor disputes of employees with disabilities (DeLeire 2000; Acemoglu and 
Angrist 2001). On the contrary, Hotchkiss (2003) pointed out that the ADA had no 
effects on the employment outcomes for labor-force participants with disabilities.  
Unlike the U.S., more than a third of OECD countries21, including South Korea 
(Korea, hereafter), have implemented the employment quota system (EQS) that requires 
private firms and/or public firms to integrate a certain number or portion of people with 
disabilities. Although the size of the quota and the establishment size of targeted firms 
may differ from country to country, the EQS usually instruments the monetary 
penalty/compensation scheme that imposes a levy if firms do not meet the quota and 
subsidize if they employ disabled workers beyond the quota. Thus, to what extent the 
EQS brings about improved employment outcomes for people with disabilities has 
aroused scholarly interests among policymakers across countries.  
4.2. The Employment Quota System for the Disabled in Korea 
The employment rate of people with disabilities in Korea is far below those of the 
overall population. In 2017, only 36.1 percent of people with disabilities aged 15 or 
more were employed, which is considerably lower than those for the overall population, 
61 percent, and below the average employment rate of people with disabilities in the 
E.U., 47.3 percent (Disability Statistics at a Glance 2018, Korea Employment Agency 
for the Disabled). In response to this disparity, the Employment Promotion Act for the 
Disabled of Korea (EPAD), which includes a clause for the levy/grant-based EQS for 
people with disabilities was signed in 1990, and then came into effect in 1991.  
                                                 




Beginning in 1991, the EQS for people with disabilities obligated a 2 percent quota to 
public and private firms with 300 or more employees, but since 2004 the quota has 
started to target firms with 50 or more employees. Although the 50-employee threshold 
is still in effect to date and is stipulated in the EPAD, an additional clause of the EPAD 
exempts the levy for firms with 50–99 employees even if they did not achieve the quota 
(Act. 33, Sec. 1, EPAD 2017). Therefore, practically, the EQS targets firms with 100 or 
more employees. The 2 percent, 50-employee quota rule had persisted up to 2009, but in 
2010 there were momentous changes in the levy/grant-based EQS in Korea.  
There have been two major changes and one minor change in the EQS since 
January 2010. First, the quota to private firms increased to 2.3 percent in 2010, and 
gradually increased to 2.5 in 2012, 2.7 in 2014, and 2.9 percent in 2018. The quota to 
public firms increased to 3 percent from 2 percent in 2010, remains unchanged until 
2016, and then increased to 3.2 percent in 2017. Second, in 2010 the double count 
system, which regards the employment of an employee with severe disabilities as the 
employment of two employees with disabilities, was implemented. The one minor 
change in 2010 is related to the grant policy for firms with employees with disabilities 
beyond the quota. The calculation criteria for the grants until March 2010 are shown in 
table C-1. Under this system, firms which have achieved the quota but with less than or 
at 30 percent of employees with disabilities to total employees could receive $300 per 
month for each male employee with non-severe disabilities over the quota. If a firm has 
attained the quota and integrates more than 30 percent of employees with disabilities to 




with non-severe disabilities. In this context, the unit-grant differs by gender and severity 
of disability of an excess employee with disabilities. Since April 2010, the grant 
calculation criteria have been modified, which are shown in table C-2. We can see that 
the unit-grant in reward for employing an excess employee with non-severe disabilities 
decreases with the employee’s employment periods but is uniform for those with severe 
disabilities regardless of their employment periods. The unit-grant for employing an 
excess female employee with disabilities is greater than that for employing a male 
employee with disabilities. Taken together, it might be said that the new policy was 
intended to ensure long-term employment for women with disabilities and/or people 
with severe disabilities. Additionally, calculation criteria for the levy in 2017 that have 
been unchanged since 2005 are presented in table C-3, in which stepwise increases in the 
unit-levy that is proportional to a shortfall in the quota are found. Overall, the policy 
changes in the EQS in Korea were intended to protect more vulnerable population with 
disabilities. 
The objective of this essay is to examine the effects of a combination of the three 
policy changes in the EQS on the employment outcomes of people with disabilities in 
Korea, with specific attentions paid to two unaddressed issues in the previous research 
on the ADA and EQS. First, to understand how the policy changes affected quality not 
just quantity of the employment outcomes, we look at whether the position is part-time 
or full-time as people with disabilities are more likely to be employed part-time. Second, 
since the policy changes put more weight on the employment outcomes of people with 




examine how the policy changes affects the employment outcomes for men and women 
with disabilities. 
While the quota increase may bring about an increase in the employment of 
people with disabilities, it is possible that under the double count system, an employer 
may have an incentive to hire or retain people with severe disabilities or women with 
disabilities instead of those with non-severe disabilities to meet the quota and/or receive 
more grants. At the same time, an employer, as a rational economic agent, is more likely 
to demand for employees with non-severe disabilities due to their higher productivity in 
comparison to those with severe disabilities. Moreover, although the quota increases 
since 2010 may induce improved employment outcomes among people with disabilities, 
to what extent employees with disabilities or severe disabilities take a full-time position 
is uncertain. Taken altogether, the total effects of the policy changes on the employment 
of people with disabilities or severe disabilities and men or women with disabilities are 
open to conjecture and in need of empirical examinations. 
4.3. Related Literature 
Using different data from different countries, researchers have examined the effects of 
the EQS in each country on the employment outcomes for the disabled. Mori and 
Sakamoto (2018) used data from the 2008 firms’ employment of people with disabilities 
of Japan and found that the levy/grant-based EQS, which requires a 1.8 percent quota for 
private firms with more than 300 employees, helps to increase the number of disabled 
workers among firms in the manufacturing industries. Using data from the Austrian 




looked at the quota policy in Austria, which requires firms to integrate an employee with 
disabilities per 25 non-disabled employees and found that firms with 25 non-disabled 
workers from 2009 to 2011 accommodated about 12 percent more disabled workers 
because of the levy. On the contrary, Wagner, Schnabel, and Kolling (2001) utilized data 
from the 1993 to 1998 IAB (Institute for Employment Research of the Federal Labor 
Services in Germany) establishment panel and conclude that the EQS in Germany that 
requires private firms with 15 employees or more to employ six percent of disabled 
workers had no effect. 
 In the case of Korea, Nazarov, Kang, and Schrader (2015) used data from the 
Korean Labor and Income Panel Study (KLIPS) and found that the expansion of 
establishment size under the EQS from 300 to 50 or more employees in 2004 led to an 
increase in labor-force participation but had no effect on the employment of the labor-
force participants with disabilities. Recently, Jeong and Ko (2014) have utilized 
administrative longitudinal data from the current implementation status of the mandatory 
employment for the disabled in Korea and found that the double count system in 2010 
led to an increase in the number of workers with severe disabilities by 0.12.  
4.4. Data and Measure for Analyses 
We utilize data from the first wave22 of the Panel Survey of Employment of the 
Disabled (PSED) in Korea 2008–2015, which is provided by the Employment 
Development Institute under the sponsorship of the Korea Employment Agency for the 
                                                 





Disabled. The PSED is a nationally representative yearly panel survey23 targeting 
randomly selected 5,000 people with disabilities since 2008. The PSED is well-suited to 
this essay in that it includes various information about demographic characteristics, 
disability, and employment of people with disabilities in Korea. More importantly, in 
comparison with many other surveys in Korea and other countries, the PSED targets 
people with disabilities registered as disabled by the Ministry of Health and Welfare of 
Korea via determinations of medical institutions, accordingly survey participants’ 
disability status is most likely measurement-error free. 
As the PSED surveys individuals registered as disabled at the interview point, 
assessing whether respondents are disabled is not necessary. The respondents’ degree of 
disability is more implicative. In Korea, types24 of disabilities are assorted into 15 types, 
and each type is rated as 1-7 degree, of which the 1st degree refers to the most severe 
status and the 7th refers to the least one. Based on the type, degree, and multiplicity of 
disabilities, medical institutions determine a person’s disability status as severe or non-
severe (Act. 2, EPAD 2017), and respondents are asked to provide information on their 
severity of disability.  
The PSED provides respondents’ employment status as follows. Respondents are 
asked whether they are employed or not within one week prior to interview, of whom the 
employed are grouped into: salaried, self-employed, and unpaid family employee. The 
salaried employees are asked their detailed job information: part-time or full-time, rank, 
                                                 
23 Surveyed in May to October in 2008 and May to August thereafter. 
24 Physical, brain lesions, vision, hearing, communicative, cognitive, and mental disability and epilepsy, kidney, heart, 




industry, and establishment size. Unemployed respondents are asked whether they are 
inactive or job-seeking in the last week from the survey. Using these classifications, we 
classify respondents’ employment status as employed, self-employed (including unpaid 
family employee), unemployed-but-active, and inactive, which is a standard 
classification of work-force in the labor market. Because the self-employed with 
disabilities may not be directly affected by the policy changes, to estimate the policy 
effects more precisely, we classify respondents employed or unemployed-but-active as 
salaried labor-force participants and self-employed or inactive as non-salaried labor-
force participants. Accordingly, the salaried labor-force participants’ employment 
outcomes can be defined ordinally as 1 for unemployed-but-active, 2 for part-time, and 3 
for full-time employed. The non-salaried labor-force participants are treated as a non-
selected sample.  
To design an analytical sample, a selection of eligible labor-force participants 
and non-participants is important as people at certain ages have strong labor-force 
attachment. Because college-education25 is common in Korea, and Koreans usually 
graduate from college around age 25 and become eligible for the national pension at age 
60, we restrict the respondents to aged 25–60 in 2008 that comprise 3,370 people with 
disabilities. As these respondents are repeatedly surveyed year by year, over the survey 
period 2008–2015, there are 24,735 observations that constitute a pooled-panel, which is 
a primary analytical sample26 in this essay. Summary statistics of the sample 
                                                 
25 In 2008, the college entrance rate was nearly 84 percent (Statistics from Korean educational development institute). 




(N=24,735) by salaried labor-force participation and employment outcomes are 
presented in table C-4, in which respondents’ various demographic information at the 
individual and household levels are included: age, educational attainment, marital status, 
gender, self-assessed health status, disability, home-ownership, non-labor financial 
income, province of residence, and respondents’ father’s job status when the respondents 
are at age 14.  
The sample is comprised of 31 percent salaried labor-force participants and 69 
percent non-participants. Of the non-participants, 75 percent are out of the labor-force 
and 25 percent are self-employed. Of the participants, about 91 percent are employed. 
People with severe disabilities are less likely to participate in the salaried labor-force and 
participants with severe disabilities are more likely to have poor employment outcomes.  
4.5. Methodology 
We employ a standard ordered Probit model with sample selection27 following Green 
and Hensher’s (2009) and Luca and Perotti’s models (2011). Consider a model of 
employment outcomes with selection into salaried labor-force participation. For notional 
simplicity, subscripts for indexing an individual are dropped. 
-Participation equation: 
 (14) 𝑆𝑖
∗ = 𝛼′𝑧𝑖 + 𝑢𝑖 with  𝑆𝑖 = 1 𝑖𝑓 𝑆𝑖
∗ > 0 and 𝑆𝑖 = 0 otherwise. 
-Employment outcome equation: 
 (15) 𝐸𝑖
∗ = 𝛽′𝑥𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖 with 𝐸𝑖 = 𝑗   if   𝜇𝑗−1 < 𝑦
∗ ≤ 𝜇𝑗  and 𝑗 = 1, 2, or 3 for each i. 
                                                 
27 Similarly, Hotchkiss (2003) and Nazarov, Kang, and Schrader (2015) used a Probit model with sample selection for 





 (16) 𝐸𝑖 and 𝑥𝑖 are observed when 𝑆𝑖 = 1 
where, 𝑆𝑖 is an individual i’s observed salaried labor-force participation, which equals 1 
if participate. 𝐸𝑖 is a participant’s employment outcome, equals 3 if employed full-time, 
2 if employed part-time, and 1 if unemployed-but-job-seeking. 𝛼′ and 𝛽′ are 
conformable parameters. 𝜇1 and 𝜇2 are estimable cutoff points, and 𝜇0 and 𝜇3 are 
taken as −∞ and +∞, respectively. 𝑥𝑖 and 𝑧𝑖 include a respondent’s demographic 
characteristics, an indicator of severe disability (equals 1 if severely disabled and 0 
otherwise), year dummy variables (2009–2015, 2008 base), and interaction terms 
between the year dummy variables and the indicator of severe disability. Additionally, to 
control for unobserved heterogeneity that may affect employment outcomes and 
participation in the salaried labor-force, such as recovery from the 2008 recession, 
provincial dummies and variables for provincial unemployment and economic growth 
rates of each year 2008–2015 are included. An intercept term in the employment 
outcome equation is normalized to zero for identification. 𝑢𝑖and 𝜀𝑖 are jointly normally 
distributed error terms with zero means, unit variances, and correlation, ρ. 
  Identification of the model follows nonlinearity of the error terms. However, 
estimation performance solely relying on the nonlinearity tends to be poor and the model 
may be failed to converge. To obtain precise estimates, we impose exclusion restrictions 
that require at least one variable, highly correlate with the participation equation but not 
correlated with the employment outcome equation under control for sample-selection, to 




participation equation. The first variable represents a respondent’s nonlabor financial 
income28, which is used in Hotchkiss’s (2003) and Nazarov, Kang, and Schrader’s 
(2015) models. Arguably, nonlabor financial income is negatively correlated with 
participation in salaried labor-force since it could incentivize being self-employed but 
demotivate individuals’ job hunting. The second one included pertains to a respondent 
father’s job status: salaried, self-employed, unemployed-but-job-seeking, or inactive 
when the respondent was 14 years old, which is coded as 1 if the father was a salaried 
employee and 0 otherwise. We expect that respondents who has a salaried-father in their 
adolescence are more likely to participate in the salaried labor-force. 
The equations (14) and (15) is estimated by a full information maximum 
likelihood (FIML) method, the log-likelihood function of which is written as Green and 
Hensher’s (2009)’s specification; 
 (17)  log 𝐿 =  ∑ logΦ(−𝛼′𝑤)𝑆=0  
+∑ ∑ 𝑚𝑖𝑗log[Φ2(𝜇𝑗 − 𝛽





,where 𝑚𝑖𝑗 = 1 if 𝐸𝑖 = 𝑗. Φ denotes the standard normal distribution function and 
Φ2 denotes the joint normal distribution function. The first term in the right-hand side 
refers to an individual i’s log-likelihood contribution to the overall log-likelihood value 
which is governed by the selection mechanism, and the second term refers to the log-
likelihood contribution of participant i to the overall log-likelihood value with regard to 
one of the employment outcomes: unemployment, part-time, and full-time. Based on the 
                                                 




parameter estimates, we calculate the Average Partial Effects (APEs) of the covariates 
on the employment outcome and salaried labor-force participation. To compute the 
APEs of the interaction terms, as Karaca-Mandic, Norton, and Dowd (2012) proposed, 
we compute the differences in the probabilities of the employment outcomes and 
participation by severity of disability, evaluate these differences at each year 2008–2015, 
and average them over observations. Since we deal with repeated observations year by 
year, robust standard errors of the estimates are clustered at the individual level.  
4.6. Results 
4.6.1. Results from the Full-Sample Model 
Based on the parameter estimates reported in table C-5, we compute the APEs shown in 
table C-6. For people with disabilities, positive and significant factors related to 
participation in the salaried labor-force include being younger and married and having 
higher education, home-ownership, and good-health, in addition to gender (male) and 
living in a larger household. More importantly, people with severe disabilities are less 
likely to participate in the salaried labor-force by 21.4 percent points than those with 
non-severe disabilities, and overall no notable variations in this tendency are found with 
respect to year-control 2008–2015. The time dummies for every year except 2009 are 
not statistically significant, implying that no notable changes are observed in 
participation rates among people with disabilities over time. Additionally, we find that 
the variables for exclusion restrictions are statistically significant and have expected 
signs. That is, people with disabilities with a salaried father when they were 14 years old 




income increase, they are less likely to participate. The statistically significant 
correlation coefficient in table C-5, 0.9, implies that unobservables that make it more 
likely to participate are positively correlated with better employment outcomes. 
Turning to the estimates of the employment outcomes, among salaried labor-
force participants, those who are younger, male, married, high school or college 
educated, in good health, and homeowners are more likely to be part-time or full-time; 
thus, they are less likely to be unemployed. Among participants, the severely disabled 
are less likely to be employed part-time by 8.8 percent points than the non-severely 
disabled, and an overall decrease in this tendency is found over the period 2010–2015; 
differences in the probabilities of part-time employment between the non-severely and 
severely disabled salaried labor-force participants get smaller. Similarly, this tendency is 
found in the probabilities of unemployment and full-time employment as well.  
Turning to the year dummies in the employment outcomes, we find that all of 
them except for 2009 and 2010 are significant and have signs that are supportive of 
enhanced employment outcomes of participants with disabilities, meaning that the policy 
changes began to take into effect in 2011. However, no decreasing or increasing trends 








Women with disabilities may have less attachment to the labor-force than men with 
disabilities, and even women with severe disabilities are more likely to attain 
substantially poor employment outcomes than men with severe disabilities. In this 
section, we iterate the analysis using subsamples by gender to investigate which cohorts 
are far more influenced by the changes in the employment policies for people with 
disabilities. To test gender-equivalence that based on all the parameter, a Wald test for 
sample-split by gender is carried out. The test statistics reject the null hypothesis of 
equal coefficients (𝜒2(79)=310.78, p<0.001), meaning that on the basis of observed 
individual characteristics, men and women with disabilities differ in both employment 
outcomes and participation in the salaried labor-force. 
Given the parameter estimates for a sample of males in table C-7, the APEs are 
computed, which are shown in table C-8. On the whole, the signs and statistical 
significances of the APEs are analogous to those of the full sample model. Men with 
severe disabilities are less likely to participate in the salaried labor-force. The male 
participants with severe disabilities are more likely to be unemployed with an overall 
decreasing trend from 2010 to 2015, less likely to be part-time employed with a 
decreasing trend from 2010 to 2013, and less likely to be full-time employed with an 
overall decreasing trend from 2010 to 2015 than male participants with non-severe 
disabilities. 
The year dummies 2011–2015 are statistically significant and have the same sign 
as those of the full model. On the other hand, an increasing trend appears in the 




disabilities are more likely to be employed part-time year by year, which is not found in 
the full-sample model. Two instruments are statistically significant at the 10 percent 
level of significance and have expected signs as those of the full model.  
The APEs that based on the parameter estimates in table C-9 are shown in table C-10. 
Among women with disabilities, those who are older, in bad health, and severely 
impaired are less likely to participate in the salaried labor-force than their respective 
counterparts. Women with disabilities with college degree or more are more likely to 
participate in the salaried labor-force than those who have not completed high-school.  
However, for each employment outcome, all of the variables for demographic 
characteristics of female participants with disabilities turned out to be statistically 
insignificant. Furthermore, all the year dummies in the employment outcomes appear to 
be statistically insignificant, meaning that the employment policy changes since 2010 
have no effects on the employment outcomes of female participants with disabilities. In 
contrast, we can see that beginning in 2011 female participants with severe disabilities 
rather than with non-severe disabilities are more likely to have a full-time job and less 
likely to be unemployed. As for the instruments, only the variable for non-labor financial 
income is significant at the 10 percent level of significance.  
The results from the gender analyses suggest that on the whole women with 
disabilities are substantially disadvantaged in the labor market. First, we did see that all 
of the demographic factors of the female participants with disabilities are not predictive 
of their employment outcomes at all. This can be attributable to their substantial 




such as higher education or good-health, which could be related to improved 
employment outcomes, have no effects on the employment outcomes positively. Second, 
the employment policies for people with disabilities do not have significant effects on 
the employment outcomes of female participants with disabilities, which contrast sharply 
to those for male participants with disabilities. Although female participants with severe 
disabilities are more likely to be full-timers and less likely to be unemployed than those 
with non-severe disabilities, which can be attributable to the reformation of the grant 
policy that put more weight on protecting long-term employments of women with severe 
disabilities, in an overall sense, employment of the female participants with disabilities 
are not affected by the policy changes. Eventually, the significant policy effects are most 
likely to be stemmed from the improved employment outcomes among the male 
participants with disabilities.  
4.7. Robustness  
One could argue that the time dummies and their interactions with the indicator of severe 
disability in both equations may reflect not only changes in the employment policies for 
people with disabilities, but also unobservable secular trends associated with each of the 
dependent variables, which could result in faulty analyses. To examine this possibility, 
we conduct robustness checks by estimating the models (the full model and the gender 
models) with a linear trend variable that interacted with the indicator of severe disability 
(“trend variable” for short). The trend variable controls for unobservable trends related 
to both the dependent variables for the non-severely and severely disabled. In this 




the time dummies. This test is analogous to a specification performed by Acemoglu and 
Angrist (2001). Parameter estimates of the full-model and the corresponding APEs are 
presented in table C-11 and C-12, respectively. In table C-12, we can see that the trend 
variable in each of employment outcomes and participation is not statistically 
significant, meaning that it rarely related to unobservable secular trends in employment 
outcomes and participation. For the employment outcomes, the indicator for severe 
disability and its year controls are still significant and have same signs as those of the 
main model. Moreover, most of the year dummies have expected signs and are 
statistically significant, though some of them for 2014 and 2015 turned out to be 
statistically insignificant. For participation, however, the indicator of severe disability 
and its year controls changed their signs. Similarly, most of the year dummies change 
their signs but turned out to be statistically significant, which might be due to 
multicollinearity between the trend variable and the indicator of severe disability, and/or 
the trend variable and the year dummies.  
Similarly, we apply the specification to the sample of males and females with 
disabilities, and resultant parameter estimates and the APEs are presented in tables C-13 
through C-16. In table C-14, we can see that for the sample of males, the trend variables 
are not significant in all the employment outcomes and participation. Moreover, the 
indicator of severe disability with its year controls are all significant and have expected 
signs in the employment outcomes, but changes their signs in participation, and all the 
year dummies in the part-time employment turned out to be statistically insignificant. 




the employment outcomes and participation are not significant, and the indicators of 
severe disability and its year controls change their signs, but most of the year dummies 
are statistically insignificant. 
Taken altogether, the results we obtained in the specifications of the robustness 
checks suggest that the trend variables in all the models hardly contribute to capture 
omitted variables reflecting unobserved secular trends related to both employment of the 
participants with severe and non-severe disabilities. 
4.8. Discussion and Conclusions 
This essay seeks to find empirical evidence on the policy effectiveness; how the changes 
in employment policies for the disabled in Korea affect employment outcomes of people 
with disabilities. Our results suggest that starting in 2011 the policy changes lead to 
enhanced employment outcomes of men with disabilities participating in the salaried 
labor-force. Additionally, we find that the policy changes contribute to promote better 
employment outcomes for male participants with severe disabilities in that overall 
disparities in the probabilities of enhanced employment outcomes between the non-
severely and severely disabled male participants narrowed over the period 2010–2015. 
Note that since the three policy changes were implemented in early 2010, we could not 
figure out how much each policy affects employment outcomes of the participants with 
severe and non-severe disabilities. However, we find that a combination of the policies is 
an effective way to promote employment outcomes of male participants with disabilities. 
What we need to scrutinize is that for men with disabilities, no marked changes in the 




the policies have changed since January 2010, but some changes in the predicted 
probabilities in the employment outcomes are observed at least in 2011. This policy-lag 
can be attributable to the survey period of the PSED. As the 2010 PSED was conducted 
from May to August, it is possible that firms during that period might not fully adjust 
their employment plans to meet the required quota.  
 On the contrary, our findings suggest that female participants’ employment is 
not affected by the changes in the employment policies; even they appear to be 
substantially disadvantaged in the labor market. To promote and secure their 
employment, it is desirable to program other employment policies which could be more 
effective to encompass those vulnerable cohorts into the workplaces. For example, a 
double count system that regards employment of one woman with disabilities as 
employment of two employees with disabilities may yield different employment 
outcomes of women with disabilities. Our results contribute to provide empirical 
evidence that the combination of the changes in the employment policies for the disabled 
can play a significant role for integrating more of disabled workers in the workplaces at 
least for men with disabilities and can be used as a reference to design employment 







A variety of assistance programs and policies not only in the U.S. but in other countries 
play important roles to provide safety nets for people with disabilities and understanding 
their roles and to what extent their desired outcomes are achieved are important for 
designing a better policy. The overall objective of this dissertation is to provide a better 
understanding of the effects of program participation and policy changes on the 
economic well-being of the populations with disabilities by; (1) analyzing the 
relationships between food insecurity and various disability characteristics of a 
household member and looking at how the relationship varies with participation in 
assistance programs; (2) examining the effects of SNAP participation on food insecurity 
for households with disabled members; (3) estimating the attenuated program 
effectiveness of SNAP due to the 2013 SNAP benefit changes; and (4) analyzing the 
effects of the changes in the disability employment policies on the employment 
outcomes for people with disabilities. 
 In the first essay, we identify a household member’s six types––vision, hearing, 
physical, cognitive, communicative, and self-care––of disabilities, severity and 
multiplicity of these disabilities, severity of mental disorder based on the 6-item Kessler 
index, and who in a household has a disability among a household head, spouse/partner, 
and children. Using these indicators of disability and ordered Probit models, we find that 
each of the indicators of disability of a household member is highly predictive of food 




assistance programs may shield food security from a household member’s aggravated 
psychological distress. 
In the second essay, we focus on SNAP and examine how SNAP participation 
reduces food insecurity for households with disabled members using indicators of the 
presence of member(s) with disabilities and who in the household has a disability. To 
obtain more efficient estimation results, we apply copula joint distribution functions to 
switching regression models with a set of valid instruments representing state-specific 
SNAP policies. Estimation results suggest that SNAP participation is more effective in 
reducing food insecurity for households disabled members than those without disabled 
members, and the effectiveness differs by the presence of a spouse/partner and children 
with and without disabilities. Additionally, we find that the 2013 SNAP benefit 
decreases attenuated the program effectiveness of SNAP, and the results highlight an 
importance of a distributional assumption of the switching regression model, which is 
decisive on the estimated treatment effects. 
The third essay in this dissertation turns to the set of policy changes in the 
employment quota system for people with disabilities in South Korea, which have not 
been operated in the U.S. We employ ordered Probit models with sample selection in 
order to endogenize salaried-labor force participation and differentiate an employment 
outcome into unemployment, part-time, and full-time. Survey respondents’ severity of 
disability and gender are modelled since the policy changes put more weights on 
protecting secure employments of people with severe disabilities and/or women with 




employment outcomes for only men with disabilities participating in the salaried labor-
force.  
This dissertation demonstrates the roles, importance, and effectiveness of 
assistance programs in the U.S. and employment policies in Korea that aim to protect 
vulnerable population with disabilities. SNAP participation and the disability 
employment policies have significant effects on the desired outcomes of interests for 
population with disabilities. As SNAP has not administered in Korea and the EQS has 
not in operation in the U.S., this dissertation contributes to provide implications for 
mapping out prospective policies for people with disabilities in each country in a cross-
reference to the empirical evidence of another one. 
At the same time, there are some limitations in the analyses. In the first essay, 
due to the lack of valid instrumental variables related to participation in both SSI and 
SNAP, we could not directly control for potential endogeneity and use sub-sample 
analyses to partially address the problem. In the second essay, we utilize five copula 
joint distribution functions that widely used in the literature but other copulas are also 
available that may produce more efficient estimates than the best-preferred copula 
model. In the third essay, as for the ordered Probit model with sample selection, we 
assume the distribution of the error terms of the participation equation and outcome 
equation are jointly distributed. Since this assumption is too strong, applications of other 
distributions e.g. copula or Johnson’s Su-distribution could be good alternatives to yield 
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TABLES FOR SECTION 2 
 
 
Table A-1. 30-Day Scale 10-Item (Adult) Food Security Questions in the NHIS 
Item Question Response Format Coding 
1 "I/We worried whether my/our 
food would run out before I/we got 
money to buy more."  
Often true, sometimes true, or 
never true  
Affirmative if often true or 
sometimes true 
2 "The food that I/we bought just 
didn't last, and I/we didn't have 
money to get more."  
Often true, sometimes true, or 
never true 
Affirmative if often true or 
sometimes true 
3 "I/We couldn't afford to eat 
balanced meals."  
Often true, sometimes true, or 
never true 
Affirmative if often true or 
sometimes true 
4 Did you/you or other adults in your 
family ever cut the size of your 
meals or skip meals because there 
wasn't enough money for food? 
Yes/No Affirmative if yes 
5 How many days did this happen?  0–30 Continuum Affirmative if 3 or more 
6 Did you ever eat less than you felt 
you should because there wasn't 
enough money for food? 
Yes/No Affirmative if yes 
7 Were you ever hungry but didn't 
eat because there wasn't enough 
money for food? 
Yes/No Affirmative if yes 
8 Did you lose weight because there 
wasn't enough money for food? 
Yes/No Affirmative if yes 
9 Did you/you or other adults in your 
family ever not eat for a whole day 
because there wasn't enough 
money for food? 
Yes/No Affirmative if yes 
10 How many days did this happen?  0–30 Continuum Affirmative if 3 or more 




















Very Low  
Food Secure 
(4.42%) 
Household head characteristics     
Age 51.862±0.139 46.396±0.276 46.996±0.264 47.419±0.282 
Gender     
Male 48.571 39.006 36.720 37.170 
Female 51.429 60.995 63.280 62.830 
Marital status     
Married or have a partner 57.485 47.957 42.891 33.896 
Unmarried/widowed/divorced/separated 42.515 52.043 57.109 66.104 
Race     
Hispanic 10.297 19.881 22.792 15.872 
Non-Hispanic White 74.302 55.791 51.369 56.564 
Non-Hispanic Black 9.720 19.427 21.492 23.150 
Non-Hispanic Asian 4.944 3.304 2.792 1.780 
Non-Hispanic all other race groups 0.736 1.598 1.556 2.633 
Education      
Less than high school 9.664 21.911 26.584 25.007 
High school or GED 22.291 28.381 29.289 29.466 
Some college no degree 18.734 22.216 22.051 23.082 
College degree or associate degree 34.757 22.741 18.878 19.935 
Higher than college 14.553 4.751 3.198 2.510 
Employment status     
Employed (family business included) 60.983 54.319 45.824 37.994 
Unemployed 39.017 45.681 54.176 62.006 
Adults’ types and severity of disability     
Vision disability     
Without-  86.675 80.782 73.303 65.605 
Non-severe-  12.009 16.700 22.882 28.616 
Severe-  1.316 2.519 3.815 5.780 
Hearing disability     
Without-  83.106 82.729 80.460 76.010 
Non-severe-  15.055 15.207 16.474 20.595 
Severe-  1.839 2.064 3.066 3.395 
Physical disability     
Without-  84.171 76.676 68.287 59.268 
Non-severe-  10.798 15.045 19.151 22.229 
Severe-  5.032 8.279 12.562 18.503 
Cognitive disability     
Without-  86.849 79.384 73.355 63.553 
Non-severe-  11.747 18.077 22.425 28.029 
Severe-  1.404 2.539 4.220 8.418 
Communicative disability     
Without-  96.533 93.144 91.297 87.882 
Non-severe-  2.955 5.732 7.295 10.446 
Severe-  0.511 1.124 1.407 1.672 
Self-care disability     
Without-  96.990 95.246 91.647 87.524 
Non-severe-  2.341 3.636 6.417 9.430 
Severe-  0.669 1.118 1.936 3.046 
Household members’ disabilities     
Household head     
With disabilities 15.442 25.247 35.590 51.534 
Without a disability 84.558 74.753 64.410 48.466 
Spouse/Partner     




Without a disability  50.463 39.416 32.422 20.877 
Without S/P 43.970 53.375 58.731 67.825 
Children     
With disabilities 3.438 7.618 8.963 9.257 
Without a disability  24.888 34.379 32.422 22.116 
Without children 71.674 58.002 58.615 68.627 
Multiple disabilities     
0 61.712 51.947 42.633 32.832 
1 21.778 23.426 24.127 23.006 
2 9.500 12.776 15.492 17.354 
3 4.240 6.506 9.015 12.408 
4 1.868 3.661 5.301 8.292 
5 0.706 1.205 2.304 4.601 
6 0.196 0.479 1.128 1.508 
Household characteristics     
Household size 2.313±0.009 2.648±0.026 2.599±0.027 2.232±0.030 
Number of kids  0.522±0.006 0.853±0.018 0.838±0.021 0.605±0.020 
0 71.674 58.002 58.615 68.627 
1~2 22.904 30.110 29.862 23.961 
≥3 5.422 11.888 11.523 7.412 
Home-ownership     
Own 68.952 42.869 37.070 32.375 
Not own 31.048 57.131 62.930 67.625 
Federal Poverty Level      
0~0.99 9.719 28.667 37.485 45.251 
>1.99 15.708 32.850 34.837 34.020 
≥2.00 74.574 38.483 27.679 20.730 
Multiple programs participation (SSI and 
SNAP) 
    
None 90.181 64.305 54.804 46.868 
Any one of 8.250 29.069 35.341 38.100 
Both 1.570 6.626 9.855 15.032 
N=78,214     
Note: For age, household size, and number of kids, the figures refer to sample mean ± SEs. All the rest are percentage 





















Table A-3. Descriptive Statistics for Sub-Samples  
       Samples 









Household Income      
Below 200% of the FPL (low)  
(N=28,561) 
28.296 75.175 32.045 67.096 
200% to 400% of the FPL (middle)  
(N=22,526) 
30.072 19.979 29.279 21.358 
Above 400% of the FPL (high) 
(N=27,127) 
41.632 4.846 38.677 11.546 
Program Participation, below 200% of 
the FPL 
    
None  
(N=16,564) 
65.702 40.416 61.387 36.904 
Any one of   
(N=9,478) 
27.971 44.331 30.925 44.577 
Both 
(N=2,519) 





























Table A-4. Parameter Estimates for Model 1: Type and Severity of Disability 
Variables Estimate SE 
Household head characteristics   
Age 0.066 *** 0.002 
Age square –0.001 *** 0.000 
Male –0.085 *** 0.013 
Married/have a partner –0.151 *** 0.016 
Home-ownership: own –0.328 *** 0.015 
Non-Hispanic Black (Base)   
Hispanic –0.121 *** 0.020 
Non-Hispanic White –0.265 *** 0.018 
Non-Hispanic Asian –0.452 *** 0.034 
Non-Hispanic all other race groups 0.110 ** 0.055 
Less than high school (Base)   
High school or GED –0.106 *** 0.019 
Some college no degree –0.127 *** 0.021 
College degree or associate degree –0.308 *** 0.021 
Higher than college  –0.551 *** 0.032 
Unemployed 0.205 *** 0.015 
Household characteristics   
Low Income (FPL<2.00) 0.702 *** 0.016 
Household size 0.058 *** 0.008 
Number of kids: 0 (Base)   
Number of kids: 1~2 –0.082 *** 0.021 
Number of kids: ≥3  –0.175 *** 0.038 
Adults’ types and severity of disability   
Non-severe vision  0.236 *** 0.018 
Severe vision  0.340 *** 0.043 
Non-severe hearing  0.071 *** 0.019 
Severe hearing  0.103 ** 0.046 
Non-severe physical  0.270 *** 0.020 
Severe physical  0.372 *** 0.029 
Non-severe communicative 0.139 *** 0.030 
Severe communicative  –0.015  0.065 
Non-severe cognitive  0.262 *** 0.019 
Severe cognitive  0.329 *** 0.041 
Non-severe self-care  0.077 ** 0.035 
Severe self-care  0.047  0.064 
Year (2011 Base)                       
2012 –0.088 *** 0.025 
2013 –0.212 *** 0.020 
2014 –0.177 *** 0.020 
2015 –0.222 *** 0.022 
2016 –0.157 *** 0.020 
Cutoff point 1 1.899 *** 0.064 
Cutoff point 2 2.310 *** 0.064 
Cutoff point 3 2.902 *** 0.065 
N=78,214   
Note: Statistically significant at≤ 10%, **sig at≤ 5%, and *** sig at≤ 1% level of significance. Robust standard errors 





Table A-5. Parameter Estimates for Model 2: Household Member’s Disabilities 
Variables Estimate SE 
Household head characteristics   
Age 0.061 *** 0.002 
Age square –0.001 *** 0.000 
Male –0.104 *** 0.013 
Home-ownership: own –0.323 *** 0.015 
Non-Hispanic Black (Base)    
Hispanic –0.100 *** 0.020 
Non-Hispanic White –0.264 *** 0.017 
Non-Hispanic Asian –0.414 *** 0.034 
Non-Hispanic all other race groups 0.135 ** 0.056 
Less than high school (Base)    
High school or GED –0.119 *** 0.019 
Some college no degree –0.147 *** 0.021 
College degree or associate degree –0.327 *** 0.021 
Higher than college  –0.574 *** 0.032 
Unemployed 0.134 *** 0.016 
Household characteristics    
Low Income (FPL<2.00) 0.678 *** 0.016 
Household size 0.045 *** 0.007 
Household members’ disabilities    
Household head’s disabilities  0.549 *** 0.018 
Without spouse/partner (Base)    
Spouse/partner without a disability –0.200 *** 0.017 
Spouse/partner with disabilities 0.185 *** 0.027 
Without children (Base)    
Children without a disability –0.079 *** 0.022 
Children with disabilities 0.127 *** 0.033 
Year (2011 Base)                        
2012 –0.069 *** 0.025 
2013 –0.172 *** 0.020 
2014 –0.151 *** 0.020 
2015 –0.203 *** 0.022 
2016 –0.155 *** 0.020 
Cutoff point 1 1.684 *** 0.064 
Cutoff point 2 2.094 *** 0.064 
Cutoff point 3 2.684 *** 0.065 
N=78,214   
Note: Statistically significant at≤ 10%, **sig at≤ 5%, and *** sig at≤ 1% level of significance. Robust standard errors 











Table A-6. Parameter Estimates for Model 3: Multiple Disabilities 
Variables Estimate SE 
Household head characteristics   
Age 0.067 *** 0.002 
Age square –0.001 *** 0.000 
Male –0.091 *** 0.013 
Married/have a partner –0.154 *** 0.016 
Home-ownership: own –0.333 *** 0.015 
Non-Hispanic Black (Base)    
Hispanic –0.126 *** 0.020 
Non-Hispanic White –0.273 *** 0.017 
Non-Hispanic Asian –0.459 *** 0.034 
Non-Hispanic all other race groups 0.112 ** 0.055 
Less than high school (Base)    
High school or GED –0.110 *** 0.019 
Some college no degree –0.131 *** 0.021 
College degree or associate degree –0.312 *** 0.021 
Higher than college  –0.557 *** 0.032 
Unemployed 0.214 *** 0.015 
Household characteristics    
Low Income (FPL<2.00) 0.709 *** 0.016 
Household size 0.058 *** 0.008 
Number of kids: 0 (Base)    
Number of kids: 1~2 –0.082 *** 0.021 
Number of kids: ≥3  –0.179 *** 0.038 
Multiple disabilities (0 base)    
1  0.296 *** 0.016 
2 0.501 *** 0.021 
3 0.668 *** 0.027 
4 0.800 *** 0.035 
5 0.916 *** 0.052 
6 1.081 *** 0.080 
Year (2011 Base)                          
2012 –0.094 *** 0.025 
2013 –0.216 *** 0.020 
2014 –0.189 *** 0.020 
2015 –0.226 *** 0.022 
2016 –0.164 *** 0.020 
Cutoff point 1 1.919 *** 0.064 
Cutoff point 2 2.330 *** 0.064 
Cutoff point 3 2.919 *** 0.065 
N=78,214   
Note: Statistically significant at≤ 10%, **sig at≤ 5%, and *** sig at≤ 1% level of significance. Robust standard errors 











Table A-7. Average Partial Effects for Model 1: Adults’ Type and Severity of Disability 
on Food Insecurity 
Variables 







Very Low  
Food Secure 
Household head characteristics 
Age 0.002 *** –0.001 *** –0.001 *** –0.001 *** 
Male 0.017 *** –0.005 *** –0.006 *** –0.006 *** 
Married/have a partner 0.031 *** –0.009 *** –0.011 *** –0.011 *** 
Home-ownership: own 0.070 *** –0.021 *** –0.025 *** –0.024 *** 
Non-Hispanic Black 
(Base) 
        
Hispanic 0.024 *** –0.007 *** –0.008 *** –0.008 *** 
Non-Hispanic White 0.056 *** –0.017 *** –0.020 *** –0.020 *** 
Non-Hispanic Asian 0.078 *** –0.026 *** –0.027 *** –0.025 *** 
Non-Hispanic all other 
race groups 
–0.023 * 0.007 ** 0.008 * 0.009 * 
Less than high school 
(Base) 
        
High school or GED 0.021 *** –0.006 *** –0.007 *** –0.007 *** 
Some college no degree 0.025 *** –0.007 *** –0.009 *** –0.009 *** 
College degree or associate 
degree 
0.061 *** –0.019 *** –0.021 *** –0.020 *** 
Higher than college  0.095 *** –0.032 *** –0.034 *** –0.029 *** 
Unemployed –0.043 *** 0.013 *** 0.015 *** 0.015 *** 
Household characteristics 
Low Income (FPL<2.00) –0.162 *** 0.052 *** 0.059 *** 0.051 *** 
Household size –0.012 *** 0.003 *** 0.004 *** 0.004 *** 
Number of kids: 0 (base)         
Number of kids: 1~2 0.016 *** –0.005 *** –0.006 *** –0.006 *** 
Number of kids: ≥3  0.033 *** –0.010 *** –0.012 *** –0.012 *** 
Adults’ types and severity of disability 
Non-severe vision  –0.051 *** 0.015 *** 0.018 *** 0.019 *** 
Severe vision  –0.077 *** 0.021 *** 0.026 *** 0.030 *** 
Non-severe hearing  –0.015 *** 0.004 *** 0.005 *** 0.005 *** 
Severe hearing  –0.022 ** 0.006 ** 0.007 ** 0.008 ** 
Non-severe physical  –0.059 *** 0.017 *** 0.020 *** 0.022 *** 
Severe physical  –0.085 *** 0.023 *** 0.029 *** 0.033 *** 
Non-severe cognitive  –0.057 *** 0.016 *** 0.020 *** 0.021 *** 
Severe cognitive  –0.075 *** 0.020 *** 0.025 *** 0.029 *** 
Non-severe 
communicative 
–0.030 *** 0.008 *** 0.010 *** 0.011 *** 
Severe communicative  0.003  –0.001  –0.001  –0.001  
Non-severe self-care  –0.016 ** 0.005 ** 0.005 ** 0.006 ** 
Severe self-care  –0.010  0.003  0.003  0.004  
Year (2011 Base)                                                       
2012 0.019 *** –0.005 *** –0.007 *** –0.007 *** 
2013 0.044 *** –0.013 *** –0.015 *** –0.016 *** 
2014 0.037 *** –0.011 *** –0.013 *** –0.014 *** 
2015 0.046 *** –0.013 *** –0.016 *** –0.017 *** 
2016 0.034 *** –0.010 *** –0.011 *** –0.012 *** 




Note: Statistically significant at≤ 10%, **sig at≤ 5%, and *** sig at≤ 1% level of significance. Robust standard errors 
are suppressed for brevity. 
 
Table A-8. Wald Test Results for the Differences in the Effects of Disabilities by 
Severity of Disability (Model 1) 








Very low  
food secure 
Vision disability 𝝌𝟐(𝟏) = 5.62, 
p=0.018 
𝝌𝟐(𝟏) = 5.27, 
p=0.022 
𝝌𝟐(𝟏) = 5.45, 
p=0.020 
𝝌𝟐(𝟏) = 5.93, 
p=0.0149 
Hearing disability 𝝌𝟐(𝟏) = 0.46, 
p=0.496 
𝝌𝟐(𝟏) = 0.46, 
p=0.498 
𝝌𝟐(𝟏) = 0.46, 
p=0.498 
𝝌𝟐(𝟏) = 0.47, 
p=0.4943 
Physical disability 𝝌𝟐(𝟏) = 12.30, 
p<0.001 
𝝌𝟐(𝟏) = 11.91, 
p=0.006 
𝝌𝟐(𝟏) = 12.19, 
p<0.001 
𝝌𝟐(𝟏) = 12.52, 
p<0.001 
Cognitive disability 𝝌𝟐(𝟏) = 2.85, 
p=0.091 
𝝌𝟐(𝟏) = 2.42, 
p=0.120 
𝝌𝟐(𝟏) = 2.67, 
p=0.102 
𝝌𝟐(𝟏) = 3.26, 
p=0.079 
Communicative disability 𝝌𝟐(𝟏) = 5.46, 
p=0.019 
𝝌𝟐(𝟏) = 5.19, 
p=0.022 
𝝌𝟐(𝟏) = 5.41, 
p=0.020 
𝝌𝟐(𝟏) = 5.72, 
p=0.017 
Self-care disability 𝝌𝟐(𝟏) = 0.20, 
p=0.653 
𝝌𝟐(𝟏) = 0.20, 
p=0.656 
𝝌𝟐(𝟏) = 0.20, 
p=0.655 
𝝌𝟐(𝟏) = 0.20, 
p=0.655 
 
Table A-9. Wald Test Results for the Differences in the Effects of Disabilities between 
Severe Physical Disability and the Other Severe Disabilities (Model 1) 






Very low  
food secure 
Severe vision disability 𝝌𝟐(𝟏) = 0.34, 
p=0.557 
𝝌𝟐(𝟏) = 0.49, 
p=0.485 
𝝌𝟐(𝟏) = 0.41, 
p=0.521 




𝝌𝟐(𝟏) = 24.48, 
p<0.001 
𝝌𝟐(𝟏) = 23.64, 
p<0.001 
𝝌𝟐(𝟏) = 24.49, 
p<0.001 




𝝌𝟐(𝟏) = 0.64, 
p=0.423 
𝝌𝟐(𝟏) = 0.81, 
p=0.369 
𝝌𝟐(𝟏) = 0.72, 
p=0.397 




𝝌𝟐(𝟏) = 33.40, 
p=0.741 
𝝌𝟐(𝟏) = 29.97, 
p<0.001 
𝝌𝟐(𝟏) = 32.70, 
p<0.001 




𝝌𝟐(𝟏) = 19.54, 
p<0.001 
𝝌𝟐(𝟏) = 18.18, 
p<0.001 
𝝌𝟐(𝟏) = 19.34, 
p<0.001 
𝝌𝟐(𝟏) = 20.49, 
p<0.001 
 
Table A-10. Wald Test Results for the Differences in the Effects of Disabilities between 
Non-Severe Physical Disability and the Other Non-Severe Disabilities (Model 1) 










𝝌𝟐(𝟏) = 1.50, 
p=0.221 
𝝌𝟐(𝟏) = 1.38, 
p=0.2407 
𝝌𝟐(𝟏) = 1.44, 
p=0.2305 




𝝌𝟐(𝟏) = 47.63, 
p<0.001 
𝝌𝟐(𝟏) = 47.80, 
p<0.001 
𝝌𝟐(𝟏) = 47.35, 
p<0.001 




𝝌𝟐(𝟏) = 0.08, 
p=0.783 
𝝌𝟐(𝟏) = 0.05, 
p=0.818 
𝝌𝟐(𝟏) = 0.06, 
p=0.804 




𝝌𝟐(𝟏) = 12.30, 
p<0.001 
𝝌𝟐(𝟏) = 12.56, 
p<0.001 
𝝌𝟐(𝟏) = 12.37, 
p<0.001 




𝝌𝟐(𝟏) = 21.85, 
p<0.001 
𝝌𝟐(𝟏) = 21.46, 
p<0.001 
𝝌𝟐(𝟏) = 21.77, 
p<0.001 



















Household head         
With disabilities –0.128 *** 0.035 *** 0.044 *** 0.049 *** 
Without a disability        
Spouse/Partner         
Without S/P         
Without a disability 0.041 *** –0.012 *** –0.014 *** –0.014 *** 
With disabilities –0.040 *** 0.011 *** 0.014 *** 0.015 *** 
Children        
Without children         
Without a disability 0.016 *** –0.005 *** –0.005 *** –0.006 *** 
With disabilities –0.027 *** 0.008 *** 0.009 *** 0.010 *** 
N=78,214     
Note: Statistically significant at≤ 10%, **sig at≤ 5%, and *** sig at≤ 1% level of significance. Robust standard errors 
are suppressed for brevity. 
 
Table A-12. Wald Test Results for the Comparison between the Effects of 
Spouse/Partner with and without Disabilities and Children with and without Disabilities 









Spouse/Partners with vs. 
without disabilities 
𝝌𝟐(𝟏) = 179.39, 
p<0.001 
𝝌𝟐(𝟏) = 195.53, 
p<0.001 
𝝌𝟐(𝟏) = 180.23, 
p<0.001 
𝝌𝟐(𝟏) = 153.01, 
p<0.001 
Children with vs. without 
disabilities 
𝝌𝟐(𝟏) = 46.58, 
p<0.001 
𝝌𝟐(𝟏) = 53.05, 
p<0.001 
𝝌𝟐(𝟏) = 50.06, 
p<0.001 
𝝌𝟐(𝟏) = 45.48, 
p<0.001 
 
Table A-13. Average Partial Effects for Model 3: Multiple Disabilities of Adults on 
Food Insecurity  
 







Very Low  
Food Secure 
Number of Disabilities 
0 (base)     
1 –0.064 *** 0.018 *** 0.022 *** 0.024 *** 
2 –0.117 *** 0.030 *** 0.039 *** 0.047 *** 
3 –0.165 *** 0.040 *** 0.054 *** 0.071 *** 
4 –0.206 *** 0.046 *** 0.066 *** 0.093 *** 
5 –0.242 *** 0.051 *** 0.075 *** 0.116 *** 
6 –0.294 *** 0.056 *** 0.089 *** 0.150 *** 
N=78,214     
Note: Statistically significant at≤ 10%, **sig at≤ 5%, and *** sig at≤ 1% level of significance. Robust standard errors 





Table A-14. Wald Test Results for the Effects of Multiple Disabilities of Adults on Food 









1 vs 2 𝝌𝟐(𝟏) = 89.92, 
p<0.001 
𝝌𝟐(𝟏) = 85.89, 
p<0.001 
𝝌𝟐(𝟏) = 88.74, 
p<0.001 
𝝌𝟐(𝟏) = 89.11, 
p<0.001 
2 vs 3 𝝌𝟐(𝟏) = 32.15, 
p<0.001 
𝝌𝟐(𝟏) = 29.00, 
p<0.001 
𝝌𝟐(𝟏) = 31.33, 
p<0.001 
𝝌𝟐(𝟏) = 33.40, 
p<0.001 
3 vs 4 𝝌𝟐(𝟏) = 11.08, 
p<0.001 
𝝌𝟐(𝟏) = 9.56, 
p=0.002 
𝝌𝟐(𝟏) = 10.55, 
p=0.001 
𝝌𝟐(𝟏) = 11.77, 
p<0.001 
4 vs 5 𝝌𝟐(𝟏) = 3.81, 
p=0.051 
𝝌𝟐(𝟏) = 3.17, 
p=0.075 
𝝌𝟐(𝟏) = 3.56, 
p=0.060 
𝝌𝟐(𝟏) = 4.08, 
p=0.044 
5 vs 6 𝝌𝟐(𝟏) = 3.09, 
p=0.079 
𝝌𝟐(𝟏) = 3.04, 
p=0.081 
𝝌𝟐(𝟏) = 3.04, 
p=0.081 












TABLES FOR SECTION 3 
 
 
Table B-1. Summary Statistics by SNAP Participation and Food Insecurity  
Variables 
SNAP 











Household head characteristics     
Age 46.445 46.952 50.257 46.282 
Gender     
Male 28.257 27.205 41.718 36.923 
Female 71.743 72.795 58.282 63.077 
Marital status     
Married or have a partner 35.470 32.366 42.400 39.052 
Single 28.689 28.017 22.834 23.439 
Widowed/Divorced/Separated 35.841 39.617 34.767 37.509 
Citizenship     
Citizen 88.829 90.091 87.604 87.069 
Not citizen 11.171 9.909 12.396 12.931 
Race     
Hispanic 22.930 21.291 19.054 22.707 
Non-Hispanic White 45.327 46.975 61.073 50.721 
Non-Hispanic Black 27.155 27.821 13.513 22.236 
Non-Hispanic Asian 2.842 1.934 5.338 2.794 
Non-Hispanic All others 1.747 1.978 1.023 1.542 
Education      
Less than high school 34.639 36.774 21.711 26.581 
High school or GED 33.337 30.722 31.514 29.753 
Some college, no degree 17.888 19.184 21.544 23.524 
College degree or associates 12.791 12.346 21.285 18.156 
Higher than college 1.344 0.975 3.946 1.986 
Employment status     
Employed (family business included) 33.789 25.082 47.145 44.960 
Unemployed  66.211 74.918 52.855 55.040 
Home ownership     
Own 25.629 24.382 47.591 34.259 
Not own 74.371 75.618 52.409 65.741 
Region     
Northeast 20.419 17.832 14.711 12.434 
Midwest 22.657 23.534 22.855 20.029 
South 40.664 41.658 39.589 43.228 
West 16.261 16.976 22.845 24.309 
Household members’ disabilities     
Household head     
With disabilities 34.898 53.667 22.845 37.795 
Without a disability 65.102 46.333 77.155 62.205 
Spouse/Partner     
With disabilities 5.943 10.437 6.054 8.407 




Children     
With disabilities 9.623 12.403 4.014 7.184 
Without a disability or without 
children 
90.377 87.597 95.986 92.816 
Presence of member(s) with 
disabilities 
    
One or more members with 
disabilities 
48.329 67.603 31.561 48.815 
Without disabled members 51.671 32.397 68.440 51.185 
Household characteristics     
Household size 3.006 2.775 2.377 2.498 
Receipt of SSI     
Received 23.572 32.028 5.472 11.032 
Not received 76.428 67.972 94.528 88.968 
Receipt of Medicaid     
Received 75.991 75.743 26.534 37.764 
Not received 24.009 24.257 73.466 62.236 
Receipt of TANF     
Received 12.108 14.674 1.480 3.443 
Not received 87.892 85.327 98.520 96.557 
Survey year     
2011 17.901 18.862 19.605 23.626 
2012 18.763 20.044 19.549 21.238 
2013 21.098 20.586 19.481 19.327 
2014 21.461 21.021 21.421 19.414 
2015 20.777 19.487 19.945 16.395 
SNAP benefit decreases     
Pre- 56.280 58.189 57.562 62.918 
Post- 43.720 41.811 42.438 37.082 
Instruments     
BBCE 0.875 0.873 0.860 0.879 
Combined application process 0.551 0.546 0.497 0.510 
Exclusion of all vehicles 0.841 0.836 0.832 0.829 
N=64,209     





















Table B-2. Summary Statistics for Instruments by State, Averaged over 60 Months 
State BBCE Excl. of all vehicles Combined appl. process 
Alabama 1.000 1.000 0.000 
Alaska 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Arizona 1.000 1.000 1.000 
Arkansas 0.000 0.000 0.000 
California 1.000 1.000 0.000 
Colorado 0.967 1.000 0.000 
Connecticut 1.000 1.000 0.000 
Delaware 1.000 1.000 0.000 
District of Columbia 1.000 1.000 0.000 
Florida 1.000 1.000 1.000 
Georgia 1.000 1.000 0.000 
Hawaii 1.000 1.000 0.000 
Idaho 1.000 0.086 0.000 
Illinois 1.000 1.000 0.000 
Indiana 0.000 1.000 0.000 
Iowa 1.000 1.000 0.000 
Kansas 0.000 1.000 0.000 
Kentucky 1.000 1.000 1.000 
Louisiana 0.717 1.000 1.000 
Maine 1.000 1.000 0.000 
Maryland 1.000 1.000 1.000 
Massachusetts 1.000 1.000 1.000 
Michigan 1.000 0.155 1.000 
Minnesota 1.000 1.000 0.000 
Mississippi 1.000 1.000 1.000 
Missouri 0.000 1.000 0.000 
Montana 1.000 1.000 0.000 
Nebraska 0.850 0.000 0.000 
Nevada 1.000 1.000 0.000 
New Hampshire 1.000 1.000 0.000 
New Jersey 1.000 1.000 1.000 
New Mexico 1.000 1.000 0.633 
New York 1.000 1.000 1.000 
North Carolina 1.000 1.000 1.000 
North Dakota 1.000 1.000 0.000 
Ohio 1.000 1.000 0.000 
Oklahoma 1.000 1.000 0.000 
Oregon 1.000 1.000 0.000 
Pennsylvania 1.000 0.397 1.000 
Rhode Island 1.000 1.000 0.000 
South Carolina 1.000 1.000 1.000 
South Dakota 0.000 0.000 1.000 
Tennessee 0.000 1.000 0.000 
Texas 1.000 0.000 1.000 




Vermont 1.000 1.000 0.000 
Virginia 0.000 1.000 1.000 
Washington 1.000 1.000 1.000 
West Virginia 1.000 1.000 0.000 
Wisconsin 1.000 1.000 0.000 
Wyoming 0.000 0.845 0.000 
Note: Each policy variable is coded as 1 if the states have the policies, and 0 otherwise. Source: Author’s calculation 
based on USDA SNAP policy data sets 2011–2015.  
 
Table B-3. Summary Statistics for Instruments by Year, Averaged over States 









 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
BBCE 0.786 0.804 0.804 0.796 0.784 
Excl. of all vehicles 0.871 0.851 0.843 0.843 0.855 




Table B-4. Parameter Estimates for Model 1 with AMH–Plackett Copula 
Variables 
SNAP FI (SNAP) FI (Non-SNAP) 
Estimate SE Estimate SE Estimate SE 
Age 0.035 *** 0.002 0.059 *** 0.006 0.076 *** 0.003 
Age square 0.000 *** 0.000 –0.001 *** 0.000 –0.001 *** 0.000 
Male –0.155 *** 0.016 –0.063 ** 0.030 –0.129 *** 0.018 
(Ref.:widowed/divorced/separated)        
Married/Have a partner –0.298 *** 0.020 0.042 0.040 –0.204 *** 0.025 
Single 0.029 0.022 –0.044 0.032 –0.141 *** 0.026 
Citizen 0.171 *** 0.023 –0.086 ** 0.042 0.104 *** 0.027 
Unemployed 0.346 *** 0.016 0.089 ** 0.040 0.196 *** 0.021 
Home owned –0.394 *** 0.017 –0.002 0.043 –0.313 *** 0.022 
(Ref.: Less than high school)       
High school or GED –0.164 *** 0.019 –0.066 ** 0.032 –0.170 *** 0.023 
Some college, no degree –0.291 *** 0.022 0.036 0.042 –0.166 *** 0.027 
College degree or associates –0.384 *** 0.024 –0.026 0.051 –0.294 *** 0.029 
Higher than college  –0.555 *** 0.056 –0.128 0.124 –0.492 *** 0.057 
(Ref.: Non-Hispanic Black)       
Hispanic –0.082 *** 0.023 0.017 0.037 –0.160 *** 0.029 
Non-Hispanic White –0.236 *** 0.020 0.011 0.037 –0.312 *** 0.024 
Non-Hispanic Asians –0.333 *** 0.039 –0.073 0.082 –0.498 *** 0.045 
Non-Hispanic All others –0.034 0.069 0.003 0.096 –0.074 0.078 
Household size 0.093 *** 0.005 –0.057 *** 0.010 –0.022 *** 0.007 
SSI receipt 0.387 *** 0.022 0.025 0.045 0.143 *** 0.040 
Medicaid receipt 0.896 *** 0.016 –0.156 ** 0.077 0.207 *** 0.035 
TANF receipt 0.845 *** 0.033 0.047 0.074 0.428 *** 0.072 
Presence of member(s) with 
dis. 
0.224 *** 0.017 0.396 *** 0.037 0.525 *** 0.021 
(Ref.:2011)       
2012  0.051 ** 0.022 –0.014 0.036 –0.055 0.025 
2013 0.137 *** 0.023 –0.065 * 0.037 –0.109 0.026 
2014 0.086 *** 0.023 –0.052 0.037 –0.153 0.025 
2015 0.095 *** 0.023 –0.073 ** 0.037 –0.228 0.027 
BBCE 0.071 0.115     
Combined application process 0.566 *** 0.144     
Exclusion of all vehicles 0.018 0.072     
Constant –2.332 *** 0.143 –1.151 *** 0.358 –1.580 *** 0.108 
Ancillary 𝜃0 0.763 *** 0.196     
Ancillary 𝜃1 –0.616 0.411     
𝜏0 0.175 *** 0.040     
Log likelihood –59670.56      
Wald test of independence Test statistic=35.501 with P-value<0.01 
N=64,209  
Note: *Statistically significant at≤ 10%, **sig at≤ 5%, and *** sig at≤ 1% level of significance. Estimates for state-










Table B-5. Parameter Estimates for Model 2 with AMH–Plackett Copula 
Variables 
SNAP FI (SNAP) FI (Non-SNAP) 
Estimate SE Estimate SE Estimate SE 
Age 0.034 *** 0.002 0.056 *** 0.006 0.075 *** 0.003 
Age square 0.000 *** 0.000 –0.001 *** 0.000 –0.001 *** 0.000 
Male –0.159 *** 0.016 –0.061 * 0.031 –0.137 *** 0.018 
(Ref.:widowed/divorced/separated)        
Married/Have a partner –0.325 *** 0.021 –0.044 0.046 –0.259 *** 0.027 
Single 0.027 0.022 –0.054 * 0.032 –0.145 *** 0.026 
Citizen 0.172 *** 0.023 –0.097 ** 0.042 0.106 *** 0.027 
Unemployed 0.329 *** 0.017 0.045 0.042 0.160 *** 0.022 
Home owned –0.388 *** 0.017 0.021 0.044 –0.303 *** 0.022 
(Ref.: Less than high school)       
High school or GED –0.162 *** 0.019 –0.061 * 0.032 –0.168 *** 0.024 
Some college, no degree –0.289 *** 0.022 0.050 0.042 –0.167 *** 0.028 
College degree or associates –0.380 *** 0.024 –0.013 0.053 –0.286 *** 0.029 
Higher than college  –0.552 *** 0.056 –0.110 0.126 –0.484 *** 0.058 
(Ref.: Non-Hispanic Black)       
Hispanic –0.081 *** 0.023 0.023 0.037 –0.159 *** 0.029 
Non-Hispanic White –0.237 *** 0.020 0.013 0.037 –0.314 *** 0.024 
Non-Hispanic Asians –0.330 *** 0.039 –0.061 0.082 –0.493 *** 0.045 
Non-Hispanic All others –0.034 0.069 0.002 0.095 –0.081 0.078 
Household size 0.103 *** 0.006 –0.043 *** 0.011 0.003 0.008 
SSI receipt 0.395 *** 0.022 0.014 0.047 0.168 *** 0.041 
Medicaid receipt 0.896 *** 0.016 –0.187 ** 0.081 0.212 *** 0.036 
TANF receipt 0.842 *** 0.033 0.016 0.078 0.420 *** 0.072 
HH head’s disabilities 0.236 *** 0.019 0.372 *** 0.042 0.558 *** 0.024 
Spouse/partner’s disabilities 0.144 *** 0.031 0.349 *** 0.053 0.329 *** 0.036 
Children’s disabilities 0.068 ** 0.029 0.161 *** 0.039 0.195 *** 0.038 
(Ref.:2011)       
2012 0.052 ** 0.022 –0.014 0.036 –0.050 ** 0.025 
2013 0.138 *** 0.023 –0.067 * 0.037 –0.107 *** 0.026 
2014 0.086 *** 0.023 –0.050 0.037 –0.152 *** 0.025 
2015 0.095 *** 0.023 –0.070 * 0.037 –0.227 *** 0.027 
BBCE 0.066 0.115     
Combined application process 0.557 *** 0.143     
Exclusion of all vehicles 0.019 0.071     
Constant –2.312 *** 0.142 –0.953 ** 0.384 –1.551 *** 0.109 
Ancillary 𝜃0 0.776 *** 0.207     
Ancillary 𝜃1 –0.754 * 0.443     
𝜏0 0.177 *** 0.041     
Log likelihood –59559.36      
Wald test of independence Test statistic=35.979 with P-value< 0.01  
N=64,209  
Note: *Statistically significant at≤ 10%, **sig at≤ 5%, and *** sig at≤ 1% level of significance. Estimates for state-









Table B-6. Parameter Estimates for Model 3 with AMH–Plackett Copula  
Variables 
SNAP FI (SNAP) FI (Non-SNAP) 
Estimate SE Estimate SE Estimate SE 
Age 0.035 *** 0.002 0.059 *** 0.006 0.076 *** 0.003 
Age square 0.000 *** 0.000 –0.001 *** 0.000 –0.001 *** 0.000 
Male –0.156 *** 0.016 –0.062 ** 0.030 –0.128 *** 0.018 
(Ref.:widowed/divorced/separated)        
Married/Have a partner –0.298 *** 0.020 0.042 0.040 –0.204 *** 0.025 
Single 0.030 0.022 –0.045 0.032 –0.140 *** 0.026 
Citizen 0.172 *** 0.023 –0.087 ** 0.042 0.105 *** 0.027 
Unemployed 0.344 *** 0.016 0.089 ** 0.040 0.198 *** 0.021 
Home owned –0.394 *** 0.017 –0.001 0.043 –0.313 *** 0.022 
(Ref.: Less than high school)       
High school or GED –0.162 *** 0.019 –0.065 ** 0.032 –0.173 *** 0.023 
Some college, no degree –0.290 *** 0.022 0.037 0.042 –0.170 *** 0.027 
College degree or associates –0.381 *** 0.024 –0.026 0.051 –0.298 *** 0.029 
Higher than college  –0.553 *** 0.056 –0.129 0.124 –0.496 *** 0.057 
(Ref.: Non-Hispanic Black)       
Hispanic –0.081 *** 0.023 0.016 0.037 –0.160 *** 0.029 
Non-Hispanic White –0.237 *** 0.020 0.012 0.036 –0.310 *** 0.024 
Non-Hispanic Asians –0.335 *** 0.039 –0.072 0.082 –0.498 *** 0.045 
Non-Hispanic All others –0.035 0.069 0.001 0.095 –0.075 0.078 
Household size 0.092 *** 0.005 –0.057 *** 0.010 –0.021 *** 0.007 
SSI receipt 0.388 *** 0.022 0.024 0.044 0.145 *** 0.040 
Medicaid receipt 0.896 *** 0.016 –0.158 ** 0.076 0.208 *** 0.035 
TANF receipt 0.840 *** 0.033 0.047 0.073 0.437 *** 0.072 
Presence of member(s) with 
dis. 
0.225 *** 0.017 0.394 *** 0.037 0.524 *** 0.021 
Post-SNAP benefit decreases 0.032 ** 0.015 –0.037 0.023 –0.128 *** 0.017 
BBCE 0.088 0.114     
Combined application process 0.574 *** 0.143     
Exclusion of all vehicles –0.059 0.070     
Constant –2.284 *** 0.142 –1.166 *** 0.352 –1.634 *** 0.107 
Ancillary 𝜃0 0.782 *** 0.198     
Ancillary 𝜃1 –0.628 0.408     
𝜏0 0.179 0.039     
Log likelihood –59720.89      
Wald test of independence Test statistic= 38.148 with P-value< 0.01 
N=64,209  
Note: *Statistically significant at≤ 10%, **sig at≤ 5%, and *** sig at≤ 1% level of significance. Estimates for state-












Table B-7. Average Partial Effects for Model 1 with AMH–Plackett Copula  
Variables 
SNAP FI (SNAP) FI (Non-SNAP) 
Estimate SE Estimate SE Estimate SE 
Age 0.000 0.000 –0.001 *** 0.000 –0.002 *** 0.000 
Male –0.037 *** 0.004 –0.023 ** 0.011 –0.037 *** 0.005 
(Ref: widowed/divorced/separated)        
Married/Have a partner –0.071 *** 0.005 0.015 0.015 –0.058 *** 0.007 
Single 0.007 0.005 –0.016 0.012 –0.039 *** 0.007 
Citizen 0.040 *** 0.005 –0.032 ** 0.016 0.029 *** 0.007 
Unemployed 0.083 *** 0.004 0.033 ** 0.014 0.056 *** 0.006 
Home owned –0.094 *** 0.004 –0.001 0.016 –0.089 *** 0.006 
(Ref.: Less than high school)       
High school or GED –0.039 *** 0.004 –0.024 ** 0.011 –0.048 *** 0.007 
Some college, no degree –0.067 *** 0.005 0.013 0.016 –0.046 *** 0.008 
College degree or associates –0.087 *** 0.005 –0.009 0.019 –0.080 *** 0.008 
Higher than college  –0.116 *** 0.010 –0.047 0.044 –0.123 *** 0.013 
(Ref.: Non-Hispanic Black)       
Hispanic –0.019 *** 0.005 0.006 0.014 –0.044 *** 0.008 
Non-Hispanic White –0.057 *** 0.005 0.004 0.014 –0.090 *** 0.007 
Non-Hispanic Asians –0.074 *** 0.008 –0.027 0.029 –0.125 *** 0.010 
Non-Hispanic All others –0.008 0.016 0.001 0.035 –0.021 0.021 
Household size 0.022 *** 0.001 –0.021 *** 0.004 –0.006 *** 0.002 
SSI receipt 0.101 *** 0.006 0.009 0.016 0.042 *** 0.012 
Medicaid receipt 0.246 *** 0.005 –0.057 * 0.031 0.060 *** 0.011 
TANF receipt 0.236 *** 0.010 0.017 0.027 0.133 *** 0.024 
Presence of member(s) with 
dis. 
0.055 *** 0.004 0.148 *** 0.011 0.158 *** 0.007 
(Ref.:2011)       
2012  0.012 ** 0.005 –0.005 0.013 –0.016 ** 0.007 
2013 0.033 *** 0.005 –0.024 * 0.014 –0.032 *** 0.007 
2014 0.020 *** 0.005 –0.019 0.014 –0.045 *** 0.007 
2015 0.022 *** 0.005 –0.027 * 0.014 –0.065 *** 0.008 
BBCE 0.017 0.033     
Combined application process 0.134 *** 0.027     
Exclusion of all vehicles 0.004 0.017     
N=64,209       
Note: *Statistically significant at≤ 10%, **sig at≤ 5%, and *** sig at≤ 1% level of significance. Estimates for state-














Table B-8. Average Partial Effects for Model 2 with AMH–Plackett Copula  
Variables 
SNAP FI (SNAP) FI (Non-SNAP) 
Estimate SE Estimate SE Estimate SE 
Age 0.000 0.000 –0.002 *** 0.000 –0.002 *** 0.000 
Male –0.038 *** 0.004 –0.023 ** 0.011 –0.039 *** 0.005 
(Ref.:widowed/divorced/separated)        
Married/Have a partner –0.077 *** 0.005 –0.016 0.017 –0.073 *** 0.008 
Single 0.007 0.005 –0.020 * 0.012 –0.040 *** 0.007 
Citizen 0.040 *** 0.005 –0.036 ** 0.016 0.030 *** 0.007 
Unemployed 0.079 *** 0.004 0.017 0.015 0.046 *** 0.006 
Home owned –0.093 *** 0.004 0.008 0.017 –0.086 *** 0.007 
(Ref.: Less than high school)       
High school or GED –0.038 *** 0.004 –0.023 * 0.012 –0.047 *** 0.007 
Some college, no degree –0.066 *** 0.005 0.019 0.016 –0.046 *** 0.008 
College degree or associates –0.086 *** 0.005 –0.005 0.020 –0.078 *** 0.008 
Higher than college  –0.115 *** 0.010 –0.041 0.045 –0.121 *** 0.013 
(Ref.: Non-Hispanic Black)       
Hispanic –0.019 *** 0.005 0.009 0.014 –0.044 *** 0.008 
Non-Hispanic White –0.057 *** 0.005 0.005 0.014 –0.090 *** 0.007 
Non-Hispanic Asians –0.073 *** 0.008 –0.023 0.030 –0.124 *** 0.010 
Non-Hispanic All others –0.008 0.016 0.001 0.036 –0.022 0.021 
Household size 0.025 *** 0.001 –0.016 *** 0.005 0.001 0.002 
SSI receipt 0.103 *** 0.006 0.005 0.018 0.049 *** 0.013 
Medicaid receipt 0.245 *** 0.005 –0.070 ** 0.033 0.062 *** 0.011 
TANF receipt 0.235 *** 0.010 0.006 0.029 0.130 *** 0.024 
HH head’s disabilities 0.058 *** 0.005 0.141 *** 0.014 0.171 *** 0.008 
Spouse/partner’s disabilities 0.035 *** 0.008 0.132 *** 0.020 0.099 *** 0.011 
Children’s disabilities 0.016 ** 0.007 0.061 *** 0.014 0.058 *** 0.012 
(Ref.:2011)       
2012 0.012 ** 0.005 –0.005 0.013 –0.015 ** 0.007 
2013 0.033 *** 0.005 –0.025 * 0.014 –0.031 *** 0.007 
2014 0.020 *** 0.005 –0.019 0.014 –0.044 *** 0.007 
2015 0.022 *** 0.005 –0.026 * 0.014 –0.065 *** 0.008 
BBCE 0.016 0.027     
Combined application process 0.131 *** 0.033     
Exclusion of all vehicles 0.005 0.017     
N=64,209       
Note: *Statistically significant at≤ 10%, **sig at≤ 5%, and *** sig at≤ 1% level of significance. Estimates for state-













Table B-9. Average Partial Effects for Model 3 with AMH–Plackett Copula  
Variables 
SNAP FI (SNAP) FI (Non-SNAP) 
Estimate SE Estimate SE Estimate SE 
Age 0.000 0.000 –0.001 *** 0.000 –0.002 *** 0.000 
Male –0.037 *** 0.004 –0.023 ** 0.011 –0.036 *** 0.005 
(Ref.:widowed/divorced/separated)        
Married/Have a partner –0.070 *** 0.005 0.016 0.015 –0.058 *** 0.007 
Single 0.007 0.005 –0.017 0.012 –0.039 *** 0.007 
Citizen 0.040 *** 0.005 –0.032 ** 0.016 0.030 *** 0.007 
Unemployed 0.083 *** 0.004 0.033 ** 0.014 0.057 *** 0.006 
Home owned –0.094 *** 0.004 0.000 0.016 –0.089 *** 0.007 
(Ref.: Less than high school)       
High school or GED –0.038 *** 0.004 –0.024 ** 0.011 –0.049 *** 0.007 
Some college, no degree –0.067 *** 0.005 0.014 0.016 –0.047 *** 0.008 
College degree or associates –0.086 *** 0.005 –0.010 0.018 –0.082 *** 0.008 
Higher than college  –0.115 *** 0.010 –0.047 0.044 –0.124 *** 0.013 
(Ref.: Non-Hispanic Black)       
Hispanic –0.019 *** 0.005 0.006 0.014 –0.045 *** 0.008 
Non-Hispanic White –0.058 *** 0.005 0.004 0.014 –0.090 *** 0.007 
Non-Hispanic Asians –0.074 *** 0.008 –0.026 0.029 –0.125 *** 0.010 
Non-Hispanic All others –0.008 0.016 0.001 0.035 –0.021 0.021 
Household size 0.022 *** 0.001 –0.021 *** 0.004 –0.006 *** 0.002 
SSI receipt 0.102 *** 0.006 0.009 0.016 0.043 *** 0.012 
Medicaid receipt 0.246 *** 0.005 –0.058 * 0.030 0.061 *** 0.011 
TANF receipt 0.235 *** 0.010 0.017 0.027 0.136 *** 0.024 
Presence of member(s) with 
dis. 
0.055 *** 0.004 0.148 *** 0.011 0.158 *** 0.007 
Post-SNAP benefit decreases 0.008 ** 0.004 –0.014 0.009 –0.037 *** 0.005 
BBCE 0.021 0.027     
Combined application process 0.136 *** 0.033     
Exclusion of all vehicles –0.014 0.017     
N=64,209       
Note: *Statistically significant at≤ 10%, **sig at≤ 5%, and *** sig at≤ 1% level of significance. Estimates for state-






Table B-10. Estimates for the Average Treatment Effects on the Treated  
 ATET 
 Estimate SE 
Model 1   
Unconditional –0.132*** 0.030 
Presence of member(s) with disabilities –0.153*** 0.035 
  Without disabled members –0.114*** 0.028 
Model 2   
Unconditional –0.137*** 0.030 
HH head with disabilities –0.170*** 0.039 
HH head without a disability –0.119*** 0.035 
S/P with disabilities –0.115*** 0.042 
S/P without a disability or without S/P –0.139*** 0.035 
Children with disabilities –0.143*** 0.041 
Children without a disability or without children  –0.136*** 0.035 
Model 3    
Unconditional –0.137*** 0.032 
Pre-SNAP benefit decreases –0.153*** 0.034 
Post-SNAP benefit decreases –0.116*** 0.029 
Presence of member(s) with disabilities –0.158*** 0.029 
  Without disabled members –0.119*** 0.025 
Pre- and presence of member(s) with disabilities –0.174*** 0.039 
Pre- and without disabled members –0.136*** 0.036 
Post- and presence of member(s) with disabilities –0.137*** 0.039 
Post- and without disabled members –0.097*** 0.026 
Note: *** sig at≤ 1% level of significance. Standard errors are calculated using bootstrap methods with 50 replications. 
 
Table B-11. Robustness check 
 Unconditional ATET 
 Estimate SE 
Model 1 with IVs   
AMH–Plackett –0.132*** 0.030 
AMH–Frank –0.132*** 0.033 
Gaussian–Gaussian –0.111*** 0.040 
Model 1 without IVs   
AMH–Plackett –0.132*** 0.035 
AMH–Frank –0.133*** 0.023 
Gaussian–Gaussian –0.112*** 0.033 
Model 2 with IVs   
AMH–Plackett –0.137*** 0.030 
AMH–Frank –0.137*** 0.026 
Gaussian–Gaussian –0.122*** 0.039 
Model 3 with IVs   
AMH–Plackett –0.137*** 0.032 
AMH–Frank –0.137*** 0.035 
Gaussian–Gaussian –0.121*** 0.040 
Note: **Statistically significant at≤ 5%, and *** sig at≤ 1% level of significance. Standard errors are calculated using bootstrap 





TABLES FOR SECTION 4 
 
 
Table C-1. Monthly-Grant per Excess by Severity of Disability, Gender, and the 
Employment Rate of Disabled Employees until March 2010 
 Male, non-severe 
Female, non-
severe 
Male, severe Female, severe 
Less than or at 30% $300 $375 $375 $450 
Above 30% $400 $500 $500 $600 
Source: Employment Promotion Act for the Disabled of Korea. 
 
Table C-2. Monthly-Grant per Excess by Severity of Disability, Gender, and 
Employment Period since April 2010 
 Non-severe disability Severe disability 
Male Female Male Female 
Less than 3 years $300 $400 $400 $500 
3 years to less than 5 years $210 $280 $400 $500 
More than 5 years $150 $200 $400 $500 
Note: An employee with 6th grade disability (very minor) is considered as an excess only for 4 years of employment 
period. Source: Employment Promotion Act for the Disabled of Korea. 
 
 
Table C-3. Monthly-Levy per Shortfall by Disability Employment Rate to Quota in 2017 
Disability Employment Rate to Quota 
3/4~1 1/2~3/4 1/4~1/2 Less than 1/4 No employment 
$945 $1,001 $1,134 $1,323 $1,573 

















Table C-4. Summery Statistics  
Variables 














Age 51.80 53.49 52.22 48.04 50.73 46.94 49.13 
Gender        
    Male 0.54 0.78 0.60 0.75 0.68 0.82 0.74 
    Female 0.46 0.22 0.40 0.25 0.32 0.18 0.26 
Marital status        
    Married/have a partner 0.47 0.81 0.56 0.48 0.63 0.74 0.65 
    Single 0.53 0.19 0.44 0.52 0.37 0.26 0.35 
Education        
    Less than high school 0.61 0.62 0.61 0.46 0.56 0.26 0.44 
    High school 0.33 0.31 0.32 0.41 0.36 0.45 0.40 
    College or more 0.06 0.07 0.06 0.13 0.09 0.29 0.16 
Household size 2.48 2.94 2.60 2.82 2.96 3.28 3.06 
Health condition        
    Bad 0.74 0.54 0.69 0.50 0.47 0.31 0.41 
    Good  0.26 0.46 0.31 0.50 0.53 0.69 0.59 
Disability Status        
    Severe  0.59 0.25 0.51 0.35 0.28 0.21 0.26 
    Non-severe  0.41 0.75 0.49 0.65 0.72 0.79 0.74 
Home-ownership        
     Own 0.36 0.72 0.45 0.43 0.50 0.63 0.54 
     Rent 0.64 0.28 0.55 0.57 0.50 0.37 0.46 
Father’s job status at age 14        
     Salaried 0.27 0.15 0.24 0.35 0.25 0.30 0.72 
     The rest 0.73 0.85 0.76 0.65 0.75 0.70 0.28 
Non-labor financial income 4.25 6.22 4.74 0.35 1.88 8.79 4.19 
Observation  12,915 4,242 17,157 710 4,174 2,694 7,578 











Table C-5. Parameter Estimates for a Full Sample Model 
Variables 
Employment Outcome Salaried Labor Force Participation 
Estimate SE Estimate SE 
Age –0.020 *** 0.004 –0.020 *** 0.003 
Male 0.310 *** 0.057 0.305 *** 0.049 
Married 0.294 *** 0.072 0.115 ** 0.055 
High school 0.200 *** 0.068 0.472 *** 0.092 
College degree or more 0.693 *** 0.110 0.097 * 0.058 
Household size 0.022 0.026 0.050 ** 0.022 
Bad health  –0.438 *** 0.046 –0.469 *** 0.040 
Home-ownership 0.207 *** 0.061 0.091 * 0.049 
Severely disabled –0.613 *** 0.071 –0.591 *** 0.058 
Severely disabled *Year     
Severely disabled*2009 –0.011 0.058 –0.017 0.047 
Severely disabled*2010 0.033 0.073 –0.039 0.053 
Severely disabled*2011 –0.038 0.093 –0.108 * 0.065 
Severely disabled*2012 –0.007 0.078 –0.102 * 0.059 
Severely disabled*2013 0.113 0.086 –0.054 0.063 
Severely disabled*2014 0.125 0.088 –0.053 0.066 
Severely disabled*2015 0.173 * 0.100 –0.077 0.066 
Year     
2009 0.018 0.039 –0.060 * 0.033 
2010 0.057 0.051 –0.038 0.042 
2011 0.208 *** 0.052 0.075 * 0.040 
2012 0.246 *** 0.040 0.033 0.037 
2013 0.173 *** 0.044 0.020 0.040 
2014 0.157 *** 0.051 0.002 0.046 
2015 0.163 *** 0.056 0.065 0.047 
Father salaried at age 14   0.076 ** 0.038 
Financial income/1000   –0.585 ** 0.236 
Province economic growth 
rate 
0.005 0.006 0.000 0.004 
Province unemployment rate 0.031 0.039 0.057 * 0.032 
Cutoff point 1   –0.345 0.303 
Cutoff point 2   0.771 0.282 
Constant   0.356 0.227 
Correlation coefficient   0.901 *** 0.078 
Log-likelihood  –22,159.654   
N=24,735    
Note: *Statistically significant at≤ 10%, **sig at≤ 5%, and *** sig at≤ 1% level of significance. Estimates for 
province dummies are suppressed. Standard errors are clustered at the individual level. The intercept of the outcome 









Table C-6. Average Partial Effects for a Full Sample Model 
Variables 
Employment outcome Salaried Labor Force 
Participation Unemployed Part-time Full-time 
Estimate SE Estimate SE Estimate SE Estimate SE 
Age 0.006 *** 0.001 –0.003 *** 0.001 –0.004 *** 0.001 –0.006 *** 0.001 
Male –0.104 *** 0.020 0.047 *** 0.010 0.057 *** 0.010 0.099 *** 0.016 
Married –0.099 *** 0.025 0.043 *** 0.012 0.055 *** 0.013 0.032 * 0.019 
High school –0.067 *** 0.023 0.028 *** 0.010 0.039 *** 0.014 0.037 ** 0.018 
College degree or more –0.233 *** 0.033 0.065 *** 0.008 0.168 *** 0.033 0.161 *** 0.032 
Household size –0.007 0.008 0.003 0.004 0.004 0.005 0.016 ** 0.007 
Bad health  0.151 *** 0.015 –0.065 *** 0.007 –0.086 *** 0.009 –0.159 *** 0.014 
Home-ownership –0.069 *** 0.021 0.030 *** 0.009 0.040 *** 0.012 0.029 * 0.016 
Severely disabled 0.192 *** 0.021 –0.088 *** 0.011 –0.104 *** 0.011 –0.214 *** 0.016 
-2008 0.203 *** 0.024 –0.106 *** 0.016 –0.097 *** 0.010 –0.196 *** 0.019 
-2009 0.207 *** 0.023 –0.107 *** 0.015 –0.100 *** 0.011 –0.197 *** 0.018 
-2010 0.195 *** 0.023 –0.096 *** 0.013 –0.099 *** 0.012 –0.205 *** 0.018 
-2011 0.223 *** 0.032 –0.098 *** 0.017 –0.125 *** 0.017 –0.233 *** 0.023 
-2012 0.213 *** 0.026 –0.089 *** 0.013 –0.125 *** 0.014 –0.228 *** 0.019 
-2013 0.172 *** 0.028 –0.073 *** 0.014 –0.099 *** 0.015 –0.213 *** 0.020 
-2014 0.169 *** 0.029 –0.072 *** 0.014 –0.096 *** 0.015 –0.212 *** 0.020 
-2015 0.153 *** 0.033 –0.063 *** 0.016 –0.089 *** 0.018 –0.223 *** 0.021 
Year         
2009 –0.004 0.011 0.002 0.006 0.003 0.006 –0.021 ** 0.009 
2010 –0.023 0.017 0.011 0.008 0.011 0.009 –0.017 0.012 
2011 –0.063 *** 0.017 0.026 *** 0.009 0.037 *** 0.009 0.011 0.011 
2012 –0.080 *** 0.015 0.034 *** 0.008 0.046 *** 0.008 –0.002 0.010 
2013 –0.072 *** 0.016 0.034 *** 0.009 0.038 *** 0.008 0.000 0.011 
2014 –0.068 *** 0.019 0.033 *** 0.010 0.035 *** 0.010 –0.006 0.013 
2015 –0.077 *** 0.020 0.038 *** 0.011 0.040 *** 0.010 0.012 0.014 
Father salaried at age 14       0.025 ** 0.012 
Financial income/1000       –0.190 ** 0.076 
Province economic growth rate –0.002 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.001 
Province unemployment rate –0.010 0.013 0.004 0.005 0.006 0.008 0.019 * 0.010 
N=24,735         
Note: *Statistically significant at≤ 10%, **sig at≤ 5%, and *** sig at≤ 1% level of significance. Estimates for province dummies are suppressed. Standard errors are 





Table C-7. Parameter Estimates for a Male Sample Model 
Variables 
Employment Outcome Salaried Labor Force Participation 
Estimate SE Estimate SE 
Age –0.024 *** 0.005 –0.022 *** 0.004 
Married 0.485 *** 0.093 0.165 ** 0.075 
High school 0.237 *** 0.082 0.089 0.064 
College degree or more 0.718 *** 0.118 0.447 *** 0.100 
Household size 0.017 0.031 0.062 ** 0.027 
Bad health  –0.451 *** 0.058 –0.502 *** 0.048 
Home-ownership 0.258 *** 0.075 0.101 * 0.058 
Severely disabled –0.529 *** 0.090 –0.537 *** 0.070 
Severely disabled *Year     
Severely disabled*2009 0.019 0.070 –0.023 0.056 
Severely disabled*2010 0.039 0.088 –0.060 0.063 
Severely disabled*2011 0.012 0.113 –0.044 0.078 
Severely disabled*2012 0.022 0.091 –0.078 0.070 
Severely disabled*2013 0.183 * 0.104 –0.040 0.075 
Severely disabled*2014 0.222 ** 0.102 –0.016 0.077 
Severely disabled*2015 0.269 ** 0.113 –0.019 0.079 
Year     
2009 0.020 0.048 –0.035 0.039 
2010 0.044 0.067 –0.022 0.050 
2011 0.179 *** 0.062 0.049 0.048 
2012 0.270 *** 0.050 0.039 0.045 
2013 0.178 *** 0.056 0.025 0.047 
2014 0.202 *** 0.065 0.024 0.055 
2015 0.193 *** 0.072 0.084 0.057 
Father salaried at age 14   0.090 * 0.051 
Financial income/1000   –0.506 * 0.274 
Province economic growth 
rate 
0.006 0.007 –0.001 0.005 
Province unemployment rate 0.014 0.050 0.032 0.037 
Cutoff point 1   –0.891 0.366 
Cutoff point 2   0.355 0.345 
Constant   0.781 *** 0.266 
Correlation coefficient   0.810 *** 0.114 
Log-likelihood  –16,193.000   
N=15,862    
Note: *Statistically significant at≤ 10%, **sig at≤ 5%, and *** sig at≤ 1% level of significance. Estimates for 
province dummies are suppressed. Standard errors are clustered at the individual level. The intercept of the outcome 










Table C-8. Average Partial Effects for a Male Sample Model 
Variables 
Employment outcome Salaried Labor Force 
Participation Unemployed Part-time Full-time 
Estimate SE Estimate SE Estimate SE Estimate SE 
Age 0.008 *** 0.002 –0.002 *** 0.001 –0.006 *** 0.001 –0.007 *** 0.001 
Married –0.165 *** 0.030 0.058 *** 0.013 0.107 *** 0.022 0.056 ** 0.026 
High school –0.079 *** 0.026 0.024 *** 0.008 0.055 *** 0.020 0.030 0.022 
College degree or more –0.225 *** 0.031 0.026 0.028 0.199 *** 0.040 0.156 *** 0.035 
Household size –0.005 0.010 0.002 0.003 0.004 0.007 0.021 ** 0.009 
Bad health  0.154 *** 0.024 –0.049 *** 0.015 –0.105 *** 0.013 –0.177 *** 0.017 
Home-ownership –0.087 *** 0.024 0.028 *** 0.008 0.059 *** 0.018 0.034 * 0.020 
Severely disabled 0.148 *** 0.033 –0.052 *** 0.018 –0.096 *** 0.017 –0.198 *** 0.020 
-2008 0.182 *** 0.030 –0.081 *** 0.017 –0.101 *** 0.015 –0.186 *** 0.023 
-2009 0.176 *** 0.033 –0.076 *** 0.019 –0.100 *** 0.016 –0.192 *** 0.023 
-2010 0.169 *** 0.035 –0.070 *** 0.019 –0.099 *** 0.017 –0.204 *** 0.023 
-2011 0.176 *** 0.047 –0.061 ** 0.025 –0.116 *** 0.025 –0.202 *** 0.029 
-2012 0.171 *** 0.039 –0.048 ** 0.023 –0.122 *** 0.020 –0.212 *** 0.024 
-2013 0.117 *** 0.042 –0.034 * 0.020 –0.083 *** 0.024 –0.200 *** 0.025 
-2014 0.103 ** 0.041 –0.027 0.018 –0.076 *** 0.025 –0.192 *** 0.025 
-2015 0.087 ** 0.044 –0.022 0.017 –0.065 ** 0.028 –0.195 *** 0.027 
Year         
2009 –0.009 0.014 0.004 0.006 0.005 0.009 –0.015 0.011 
2010 –0.020 0.022 0.009 0.009 0.011 0.013 –0.015 0.015 
2011 –0.061 *** 0.020 0.022 ** 0.009 0.039 *** 0.013 0.011 0.013 
2012 –0.092 *** 0.016 0.030 *** 0.007 0.061 *** 0.012 0.003 0.013 
2013 –0.085 *** 0.018 0.034 *** 0.007 0.051 *** 0.013 0.003 0.014 
2014 –0.098 *** 0.021 0.039 *** 0.008 0.060 *** 0.015 0.006 0.016 
2015 –0.102 *** 0.022 0.041 *** 0.008 0.061 *** 0.016 0.026 0.017 
Father salaried at age 14       0.031 * 0.018 
Financial income/1000       –0.172 * 0.093 
Province economic growth rate –0.002 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.000 0.002 
Province unemployment rate –0.005 0.017 0.001 0.005 0.003 0.012 0.011 0.012 
N=15,862         
Note: *Statistically significant at≤ 10%, **sig at≤ 5%, and *** sig at≤ 1% level of significance. Estimates for province dummies are suppressed. Standard errors are 





Table C-9. Parameter Estimates for a Female Sample Model 
Variables 
Employment Outcome Salaried Labor Force Participation  
Estimate SE Estimate SE 
Age 0.011 0.007 –0.017 *** 0.006 
Married 0.007 0.108 –0.025 0.093 
High school 0.014 0.104 0.160 * 0.097 
College degree or more 0.237 0.200 0.356 ** 0.165 
Household size –0.028 0.045 0.024 0.037 
Bad health  0.116 0.099 –0.404 *** 0.071 
Home-ownership 0.040 0.095 0.077 0.086 
Severely disabled 0.211 0.216 –0.658 *** 0.111 
Severely disabled *Year     
Severely disabled*2009 –0.089 0.188 –0.015 0.096 
Severely disabled*2010 0.017 0.191 –0.005 0.103 
Severely disabled*2011 0.215 0.191 –0.272 ** 0.117 
Severely disabled*2012 0.257 0.192 –0.182 0.111 
Severely disabled*2013 0.179 0.188 –0.117 0.115 
Severely disabled*2014 0.200 0.223 –0.159 0.129 
Severely disabled*2015 0.388 * 0.223 –0.259 ** 0.127 
Year     
2009 0.146 0.096 –0.097 0.064 
2010 0.118 0.111 –0.064 0.078 
2011 0.098 0.112 0.115 * 0.067 
2012 0.094 0.099 0.043 0.067 
2013 0.062 0.096 0.033 0.073 
2014 0.033 0.106 –0.021 0.082 
2015 –0.002 0.115 0.058 0.089 
Father salaried at age 14   0.090 0.078 
Financial income/1000   –3.421 * 1.794 
Province economic growth 
rate 
0.004 0.011 0.002 0.007 
Province unemployment rate –0.063 0.083 0.119 * 0.063 
Cutoff point 1   –1.447 0.569 
Cutoff point 2   –0.029 0.541 
Constant   0.132 0.424 
Correlation coefficient   –0.918 *** 0.079 
Log-likelihood  –5,747.433   
N=8,873    
Note: *Statistically significant at≤ 10%, **sig at≤ 5%, and *** sig at≤ 1% level of significance. Estimates for 
province dummies are suppressed. Standard errors are clustered at the individual level. The intercept of the outcome 












Table C-10. Average Partial Effects for a Female Sample Model 
Variables 
Employment outcome Salaried Labor Force 
Participation Unemployed Part-time Full-time 
Estimate SE Estimate SE Estimate SE Estimate SE 
Age –0.001 0.000 –0.003 0.002 0.004 0.002 –0.005 *** 0.002 
Married 0.000 0.006 –0.002 0.029 0.002 0.035 –0.007 0.027 
High school –0.001 0.006 –0.004 0.028 0.005 0.033 0.047 0.029 
College degree or more –0.011 0.008 –0.060 0.054 0.071 0.061 0.111 ** 0.054 
Household size 0.002 0.003 0.007 0.012 –0.009 0.015 0.007 0.011 
Bad health  –0.007 0.005 –0.031 0.024 0.038 0.030 –0.123 *** 0.022 
Home-ownership –0.002 0.005 –0.010 0.026 0.013 0.031 0.022 0.025 
Severely disabled –0.018 ** 0.008 –0.096 *** 0.032 0.114 *** 0.039 –0.229 *** 0.024 
-2008 –0.014 0.013 –0.059 0.055 0.073 0.068 –0.199 *** 0.031 
-2009 –0.007 0.013 –0.033 0.068 0.040 0.081 –0.191 *** 0.029 
-2010 –0.012 0.009 –0.062 0.044 0.074 0.052 –0.193 *** 0.028 
-2011 –0.020 ** 0.009 –0.111 *** 0.041 0.131 *** 0.050 –0.275 *** 0.035 
-2012 –0.021 *** 0.007 –0.121 *** 0.034 0.142 *** 0.040 –0.245 *** 0.030 
-2013 –0.020 *** 0.008 –0.104 *** 0.035 0.125 *** 0.042 –0.230 *** 0.031 
-2014 –0.022 ** 0.010 –0.110 ** 0.050 0.133 ** 0.059 –0.232 *** 0.031 
-2015 –0.029 *** 0.008 –0.156 *** 0.037 0.185 *** 0.042 –0.264 *** 0.031 
Year                                   
2009 –0.007 0.006 –0.029 0.026 0.036 0.032 –0.030 * 0.016 
2010 –0.008 0.007 –0.035 0.032 0.042 0.039 –0.020 0.020 
2011 –0.010 0.008 –0.052 0.038 0.062 0.045 0.005 0.018 
2012 –0.010 0.007 –0.056 0.036 0.066 0.043 –0.007 0.017 
2013 –0.008 0.007 –0.039 0.033 0.046 0.039 –0.003 0.019 
2014 –0.006 0.007 –0.033 0.035 0.040 0.042 –0.023 0.022 
2015 –0.007 0.008 –0.045 0.041 0.052 0.049 –0.010 0.024 
Father salaried at age 14                        0.027 0.023 
Financial income/1000                        –0.993 * 0.522 
Province economic growth rate 0.000 0.001 –0.001 0.003 0.001 0.004 0.000 0.002 
Province unemployment rate 0.003 0.005 0.017 0.022 –0.020 0.027 0.034 * 0.018 
N=8,873         
Note: *Statistically significant at≤ 10%, **sig at≤ 5%, and *** sig at≤ 1% level of significance. Estimates for province dummies are suppressed. Standard errors are 





Table C-11. Robustness: Parameter Estimates for a Full Sample Model  
Variables 
Employment Outcome Salaried Labor Force Participation  
Estimate SE Estimate SE 
Age –0.019 *** 0.004 –0.020 *** 0.003 
Male 0.310 *** 0.058 0.304 *** 0.049 
Married 0.296 *** 0.071 0.097 * 0.058 
High school 0.202 *** 0.068 0.113 ** 0.055 
College degree or more 0.697 *** 0.110 0.470 *** 0.091 
Household size 0.022 0.026 0.050 ** 0.022 
Bad health  –0.437 *** 0.046 –0.469 *** 0.040 
Home-ownership 0.208 *** 0.061 0.090 * 0.048 
Severely disabled  –72.264 71.145 73.323 45.858 
Severely disabled *Year                                  
Severely disabled*2011 –0.113 0.095 –0.019 0.066 
Severely disabled*2012 –0.117 0.113 0.023 0.076 
Severely disabled*2013 –0.032 0.147 0.108 0.099 
Severely disabled*2014 –0.056 0.180 0.146 0.121 
Severely disabled*2015 –0.042 0.215 0.158 0.147 
Year            
2011 0.183 *** 0.044 0.110 *** 0.034 
2012 0.227 *** 0.032 0.068 ** 0.029 
2013 0.152 *** 0.037 0.053 0.033 
2014 0.130 *** 0.039 0.040 0.034 
2015 0.137 *** 0.045 0.105 *** 0.037 
Severely disabled*Linear 
trend 
0.036 0.035 –0.037 0.023 
Father salaried at age 14   0.076 ** 0.038 
Financial income/1000   –0.586 ** 0.238 
Province economic growth 
rate 
0.009 *** 0.003 0.001 0.003 
Province unemployment rate 0.041 0.035 0.044 0.028 
Cutoff point 1   –0.323 0.295 
Cutoff point 2   0.806 0.273 
Constant   0.378 * 0.221 
Correlation coefficient   0.894 *** 0.079 
Log-likelihood  –22,162.096   
N=24,735    
Note: *Statistically significant at≤ 10%, **sig at≤ 5%, and *** sig at≤ 1% level of significance. Estimates for 
province dummies are suppressed. Standard errors are clustered at the individual level. The intercept of the outcome 












Table C-12. Robustness: Average Partial Effects for a Full Sample Model 
Variables 
Employment outcome Salaried Labor Force 
Participation Unemployed Part-time Full-time 
Estimate SE Estimate SE Estimate SE Estimate SE 
Age 0.006 *** 0.001 –0.003 *** 0.001 –0.004 *** 0.001 –0.006 *** 0.001 
Male –0.104 *** 0.020 0.047 *** 0.010 0.057 *** 0.010 0.099 *** 0.016 
Married –0.100 *** 0.025 0.044 *** 0.012 0.056 *** 0.013 0.032 * 0.019 
High school –0.068 *** 0.023 0.028 *** 0.010 0.040 *** 0.014 0.037 ** 0.018 
College degree or more –0.234 *** 0.032 0.065 *** 0.008 0.169 *** 0.033 0.160 *** 0.032 
Household size –0.007 0.008 0.003 0.004 0.004 0.005 0.016 ** 0.007 
Bad health  0.151 *** 0.016 –0.065 *** 0.007 –0.086 *** 0.009 –0.159 *** 0.014 
Home-ownership –0.070 *** 0.021 0.030 *** 0.009 0.040 *** 0.012 0.029 * 0.016 
Severely disabled 0.609 *** 0.013 –0.097 *** 0.011 –0.512 *** 0.005 0.405 *** 0.008 
-2008–2010 0.596 *** 0.017 –0.096 *** 0.013 –0.501 *** 0.007 0.403 *** 0.010 
-2011 0.623 *** 0.018 –0.100 *** 0.012 –0.523 *** 0.009 0.391 *** 0.011 
-2012 0.626 *** 0.014 –0.099 *** 0.009 –0.527 *** 0.007 0.400 *** 0.009 
-2013 0.610 *** 0.016 –0.095 *** 0.011 –0.515 *** 0.007 0.412 *** 0.010 
-2014 0.612 *** 0.020 –0.097 *** 0.014 –0.515 *** 0.008 0.417 *** 0.012 
-2015 0.611 *** 0.023 –0.096 *** 0.015 –0.515 *** 0.010 0.414 *** 0.015 
Year                                                                                         
2011 –0.045 *** 0.015 0.016 ** 0.008 0.029 *** 0.008 0.033 *** 0.010 
2012 –0.060 *** 0.017 0.022 ** 0.010 0.038 *** 0.008 0.025 ** 0.011 
2013 –0.046 ** 0.022 0.019 0.012 0.027 *** 0.010 0.030 ** 0.014 
2014 –0.036 0.024 0.014 0.015 0.022 ** 0.010 0.030 ** 0.015 
2015 –0.040 0.029 0.016 0.017 0.024 * 0.012 0.054 *** 0.019 
Severely disabled*Linear trend –0.012 0.012 0.005 0.005 0.007 0.007 –0.012 0.007 
Father salaried at age 14       0.025 ** 0.013 
Financial income/1000          –0.190 ** 0.077 
Province economic growth rate –0.003 *** 0.001 0.001 *** 0.000 0.002 *** 0.001 0.000 0.001 
Province unemployment rate –0.014 0.011 0.006 0.005 0.008 0.007 0.014 0.009 
N=24,735         
Note: *Statistically significant at≤ 10%, **sig at≤ 5%, and *** sig at≤ 1% level of significance. Estimates for province dummies are suppressed. Standard errors are 






Table C-13. Robustness: Parameter Estimates for a Male Sample Model 
Variables 
Employment Outcome  Salaried Labor Force Participation  
Estimate SE Estimate SE 
Age –0.024 *** 0.005 –0.022 *** 0.004 
Married 0.486 *** 0.093 0.165 ** 0.075 
High school 0.238 *** 0.082 0.089 0.064 
College degree or more 0.720 *** 0.118 0.446 *** 0.099 
Household size 0.016 0.031 0.062 ** 0.027 
Bad health  –0.450 *** 0.059 –0.502 *** 0.048 
Home-ownership 0.259 *** 0.074 0.100 * 0.058 
Severely disabled –69.659 86.203 80.420 54.123 
Severely disabled *Year                     
Severely disabled*2011 –0.074 0.119 0.062 0.074 
Severely disabled*2012 –0.099 0.142 0.069 0.089 
Severely disabled*2013 0.029 0.185 0.147 0.118 
Severely disabled*2014 0.033 0.222 0.211 0.145 
Severely disabled*2015 0.046 0.270 0.248 0.176 
Year                  
2011 0.158 *** 0.053 0.068 * 0.040 
2012 0.253 *** 0.041 0.058 0.036 
2013 0.160 *** 0.048 0.043 0.040 
2014 0.179 *** 0.050 0.046 0.042 
2015 0.169 *** 0.059 0.107 ** 0.046 
Severely disabled*Linear 
trend 
0.034 0.043 –0.040 0.027 
Father salaried at age 14         0.090 * 0.052 
Financial income/1000         –0.506 * 0.275 
Province economic growth 
rate 
0.009 ** 0.004 0.000 0.003 
Province unemployment rate 0.025 0.044 0.024 0.033 
Cutoff point 1   –0.865 0.353 
Cutoff point 2   0.389 0.330 
Constant   0.794 *** 0.259 
Correlation coefficient   0.805 *** 0.114 
Log-likelihood  –16,193.639   
N=15,862    
Note: *Statistically significant at≤ 10%, **sig at≤ 5%, and *** sig at≤ 1% level of significance. Estimates for 
province dummies are suppressed. Standard errors are clustered at the individual level. The intercept of the outcome 













Table C-14. Robustness: Average Partial Effects for a Male Sample Model 
Variables 
Employment outcome Salaried Labor Force 
Participation Unemployed Part-time Full-time 
Estimate SE Estimate SE Estimate SE Estimate SE 
Age 0.008 *** 0.002 –0.002 *** 0.001 –0.006 *** 0.001 –0.007 *** 0.001 
Married –0.165 *** 0.030 0.058 *** 0.013 0.107 *** 0.022 0.056 ** 0.026 
High school –0.079 *** 0.026 0.024 *** 0.008 0.055 *** 0.020 0.030 0.022 
College degree or more –0.225 *** 0.031 0.025 0.029 0.200 *** 0.040 0.156 *** 0.035 
Household size –0.005 0.010 0.002 0.003 0.004 0.007 0.021 ** 0.009 
Bad health  0.154 *** 0.024 –0.049 *** 0.016 –0.105 *** 0.013 –0.177 *** 0.017 
Home-ownership –0.087 *** 0.024 0.027 *** 0.008 0.059 *** 0.018 0.034 * 0.020 
Severely disabled 0.615 *** 0.013 –0.103 *** 0.007 –0.512 *** 0.008 0.404 *** 0.010 
-2008–2010 0.609 *** 0.020 –0.107 *** 0.012 –0.501 *** 0.010 0.397 *** 0.012 
-2011 0.627 *** 0.021 –0.106 *** 0.010 –0.521 *** 0.013 0.398 *** 0.014 
-2012 0.634 *** 0.014 –0.101 *** 0.007 –0.533 *** 0.010 0.400 *** 0.012 
-2013 0.612 *** 0.018 –0.098 *** 0.009 –0.514 *** 0.011 0.411 *** 0.013 
-2014 0.612 *** 0.022 –0.097 *** 0.010 –0.516 *** 0.013 0.420 *** 0.015 
-2015 0.610 *** 0.028 –0.096 *** 0.013 –0.514 *** 0.017 0.420 *** 0.019 
Year             
2011 –0.042 ** 0.019 0.012 0.009 0.030 *** 0.012 0.031 ** 0.012 
2012 –0.069 *** 0.022 0.018 0.012 0.051 *** 0.012 0.028 ** 0.014 
2013 –0.057 ** 0.029 0.019 0.015 0.038 ** 0.015 0.033 * 0.017 
2014 –0.064 *** 0.032 0.021 0.017 0.043 *** 0.017 0.042 ** 0.020 
2015 –0.063 * 0.038 0.021 0.020 0.042 ** 0.020 0.068 *** 0.024 
Severely disabled*Linear trend –0.011 0.014 0.003 0.004 0.008 0.010 –0.014 0.010 
Father salaried at age 14          0.031 * 0.018 
Financial income/1000          –0.172 * 0.093 
Province economic growth rate –0.003 ** 0.001 0.001 ** 0.000 0.002 ** 0.001 0.000 0.001 
Province unemployment rate –0.008 0.014 0.002 0.004 0.006 0.010 0.008 0.011 
N=15,862         
Note: *Statistically significant at≤ 10%, **sig at≤ 5%, and *** sig at≤ 1% level of significance. Estimates for province dummies are suppressed. Standard errors are 







Table C-15. Robustness Check: Parameter Estimates for a Female Sample Model 
Variables 
Employment Outcome  Salaried Labor Force Participation  
Estimate SE Estimate SE 
Age 0.011 0.007 –0.017 *** 0.006 
Married 0.004 0.107 –0.025 0.093 
High school 0.014 0.104 0.160 * 0.096 
College degree or more 0.232 0.197 0.356 ** 0.165 
Household size –0.027 0.045 0.024 0.037 
Bad health  0.118 0.098 –0.402 *** 0.070 
Home-ownership 0.037 0.094 0.077 0.086 
Severely disabled –120.018 175.814 61.305 91.569 
Severely disabled *Year                                
Severely disabled*2011 0.129 0.219 –0.211 0.131 
Severely disabled*2012 0.112 0.267 –0.090 0.150 
Severely disabled*2013 –0.025 0.331 0.006 0.191 
Severely disabled*2014 –0.063 0.419 –0.006 0.229 
Severely disabled*2015 
Year 
0.063 0.506 –0.075 0.284 
2011 0.000 0.087 0.173 *** 0.052 
2012 0.002 0.072 0.100 * 0.051 
2013 –0.029 0.071 0.087 0.057 
2014 –0.070 0.070 0.041 0.058 
2015 –0.108 0.081 0.124 * 0.065 
Severely disabled*Linear 
trend 
0.060 0.087 –0.031 0.046 
Father salaried at age 14          0.091 0.077 
Financial income/1000          –3.441 * 1.777 
Province economic growth 
rate 
0.004 0.008 0.005 0.005 
Province unemployment rate –0.031 0.076 0.096 * 0.056 
Cutoff point 1   –1.390 0.556 
Cutoff point 2   0.018 0.529 
Constant   0.165 0.413 
Correlation coefficient   –0.922 *** 0.073 
Log-likelihood  –5,748.889   
N=8,873    
Note: *Statistically significant at≤ 10%, **sig at≤ 5%, and *** sig at≤ 1% level of significance. Estimates for 
province dummies are suppressed. Standard errors are clustered at the individual level. The intercept coefficient of the 














Table C-16. Robustness: Average Partial Effects for a Female Sample Model 
Variables 
Employment outcome Salaried Labor Force 
Participation Unemployed Part-time Full-time 
Estimate SE Estimate SE Estimate SE Estimate SE 
Age –0.001 0.000 –0.003 0.002 0.004 0.002 –0.005 *** 0.002 
Married 0.000 0.006 –0.001 0.028 0.001 0.034 –0.007 0.027 
High school –0.001 0.006 –0.004 0.027 0.004 0.033 0.047 0.029 
College degree or more –0.011 0.007 –0.059 0.052 0.069 0.059 0.111 ** 0.054 
Household size 0.001 0.002 0.007 0.012 -0.008 0.015 0.007 0.011 
Bad health  –0.007 0.005 –0.031 0.024 0.038 0.029 –0.122 *** 0.022 
Home-ownership –0.002 0.005 –0.010 0.025 0.012 0.030 0.022 0.025 
Severely disabled 0.528 *** 0.004 –0.060 *** 0.013 –0.467 *** 0.016 0.411 *** 0.012 
-2008–2010 0.529 *** 0.004 –0.056 ** 0.027 –0.473 *** 0.030 0.421 *** 0.016 
-2011 0.527 *** 0.004 –0.070 *** 0.019 –0.457 *** 0.022 0.385 *** 0.018 
-2012 0.527 *** 0.004 –0.068 *** 0.016 –0.459 *** 0.020 0.404 *** 0.015 
-2013 0.529 *** 0.005 –0.054 ** 0.021 –0.474 *** 0.027 0.415 *** 0.016 
-2014 0.529 *** 0.008 –0.051 0.034 –0.478 *** 0.042 0.417 *** 0.019 
-2015 0.525 *** 0.008 –0.067 * 0.038 –0.458 *** 0.046 0.403 *** 0.023 
Year                                                                                          
2011 –0.002 0.005 –0.014 0.030 0.016 0.035 0.029 * 0.016 
2012 –0.002 0.005 –0.013 0.033 0.015 0.039 0.020 0.019 
2013 0.002 0.007    0.011 0.040 –0.013 0.046 0.026 0.023 
2014 0.005 0.009 0.026 0.050 –0.031 0.060 0.011 0.025 
2015 0.005 0.010 0.021 0.059 –0.026 0.069 0.028 0.031 
  Severely disabled*Linear trend –0.003 0.005 –0.016 0.023 0.019 0.029 –0.009 0.013 
Father salaried at age 14                                                                   0.027 0.023 
Financial income/1000          –0.999 * 0.517 
Province economic growth rate 0.000 0.000 –0.001 0.002 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.001 
Province unemployment rate 0.002 0.004 0.008 0.020 –0.010 0.024 0.028 * 0.016 
N=8,873         
Note: *Statistically significant at≤ 10%, **sig at≤ 5%, and *** sig at≤ 1% level of significance. Estimates for province dummies are suppressed. Standard errors are 








FIGURES FOR SECTION 2  
 
Figure D-1. Nonparametric Regression Results for Model 4 
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